Working out the Mechanics of Manifestationism.

The question perpetually arises as to whether or not manifestationism in some way establishes itself as a force that somehow transcends its role as meta-philosophy and paradoxically backs one of the manifestations.

This seeming ridiculous hubris of a notion is what must be strived for to forge -as all philosophers strive for- the most perfect all encompassing machine possible.

Manifestationism is, we will recall the notion that every philosophy/theory is a competing manifestation of how things might be. Manifestation has a sceptical aspect to it insofar as it denies we can know for certainty any of the manifestations are definitively correct -even if one of them was. Of course some of the competing manfestations are themselves theories that speak of certain knowledge whereas others are more sceptical. This seems to show that there is some bias in manifestationism i.e. in espousing a pluralism that cannot settle on a definite system the sceptical element is in-built.

However manifestationism does not deny that one of the manifestations might be correct, it is simply that we in our limited Kantian way cannot tell which one it is. Saying that kind of thing makes out that this is just a Kantian philosophy. Well in one sense this is hard to deny and in another it’s very easy: transcendental idealism is a manifestation and hence not ascertainable as the definitive answer. So it’s reminiscent of Kant but it’s not Kant. Manifestationism is saying that each manifestation-field  (Narp, subject, take your pick) is not sufficiently equipped to be able know with certainty which manifestation is correct. It seems reasonable that all manifestation-fields should adhere to those manifestations which are most functional, however this is clearly not the case as many manifestation-fields are occupied by manifestations taken to be deeply untrue by other manifestations i.e. flat-earthers, UFO enthusiasts etc exist, and utilise their sceptical right to deny manifestations that consider them as nonsense. We like to rationalise these perspectives away with confirmation bias etc. but this only shows that we have already bought into a series of manifestations that accept confirmation bias as an explanatory notion in this respect.

So manifestationism is saying that there is an epistemological barrier with regards to understanding which manifestationism is most true. Experience at the level of the individual manifestation-field might determine unshakeable faith to a manifestation rejected by the larger field-sets.

Manifestationism also must take the same meta-scepticism about the ontology of the being that is where the manifestation processing takes place itself, hence the term manifestation-field as a notion trying to distance itself from any particular ontological bias -which is even present in Narp.

The interesting issue arises when we consider the manifestation of pure information. This ontology (pneuminosity)  says everything is information -that is, insofar as there are discreta they have relations between them which may be constituted as information. Every manifestation is a priori information. The question the other manifestations must answer to free themselves is ‘how are they not information?’. This denial seems impossible. Is then a manifestationist philosophy also a philosophy of pure information? Information in a sense seems to be an a priori that transcends the manifestationist’s scepticism. Even the speculation that all is really a non-informational continuum is contradicted by the possibility of the speculation itself. The meaning of such an ontology is one in which the continuum is pure energetic motion in which there are no discreta as such so the informational relation as description loses its force. Information as ontology gains its force from beings which conceptualise.

This means that the following manifestations are laid bare:

I) The manifestationist field encompasses a realm that is unaffected by the manifestation-field.  That is, whether there is or is not a manifestation field, this realm remains identical.


II) The manifestationist field actually affects the putative externality that the manifestations arise to comprehend -the content of the manifestation-field. In this case the information generated in the manifestation-field means that the realm with no manifestation field and the realm with one are not identical.

Something like these manifestations constitutes the primary philosophical disclosure, the primary agnostic disjunction. Alongside monism and pluralism, probably this is the fundamental basis of trying to create any ontology. But we digress.

It is not possible to escape manifestationism without privileging one manifestation, which you would have to know to be certain in order to deny the living pluralism. No ontology is compatible with manifestationism except a pure informational ontology where this pure informational level is not an idealism but rather only idealism/realism/monism/pluralism as information, it is something prior to any of these. As soon as the information is decided as an ontology it lapses into a manifestation.

There’s something fascinating here that needs more work. This will have to wait for another day.





    1. I think that most philosophy argues amongst itself precisely because there will always be weak points in different philosophies. These may look cogent to the author and its supporters but may be found wanting from its critics. At the level at which these ambiguities occur neither of these advocates will be actually correct or not (actual correctness is not really obtainable). So a theory might seem to contradict itself from a critic’s perspective that others will defend as non-contradictory. If it was possible to resolve these issues categorically there would be a lot fewer philosophies around. For this reason (and others) I appeal to the notion of a meta-philosophy like manifestationism precisely to show how the territory is contested between the theories, non-of which can deliver a knock out blow to the other.

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    1. I suppose because I kind of think its the kind of question that doesn’t get us anywhere. If there exists a theory that seems to contradict itself then if we agree with the contradiction we’re liable to say things like ‘the theory isn’t right’. But if someone defends this theory and makes a case for the non-contradicting nature of the theory, well they don’t think the theory is false, they think minimally that there’s something there. Who are we to say they are wrong? They presumably believe their arguments. When we have pure formality we can speak (better) of truth and falsity but at the level of language, this isn’t a goer with the same clarity. Ambiguity creeps in allowing the space for two different sets of arguments concerning a theory, one that suggests a self contradiction and one that rejects this. Of course we could make a straw man to show something like this but this would hardly prove the point. Philosophers don’t tend write in self contradictions that do not allow for ambiguity -because they didn’t intend the self contradictory interpretation. So it is possible to create a theory that contains a self contradiction such that it could be met with general agreement as to its damning the theory (but very unlikely).

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