Transcendental Vectors notes (vi): Agnostic Disjunction

All of this writing about vectors might seem like just a theory of how designation occurs. As a theoretical extension of Wittgenstein this is true. Why however would we want to bother? The answer is because the transcendental vector theory seems to give an adequate description for the autonomy of concepts. The vector field  is not conceptual,  it just makes concepts possible. The perpetual issue we are trying to deal with is manifestation of a magickal ontology. This entails that the pneuminous order (informational) must be capable of altering the putative solidity (a heuristic distinction).

Transcendental vector theory must itself split in line with the agnostic disjunction: magick obtains/does not obtain (where magick means the pneuminous interference possibility). In the first arm of the disjunction, concepts must actually attach to the vectors. This is where the term comes from, the vector is host to the concept literally, since concept and vector cannot be identical, the vector is carrying alien information in it (even though it may be a fair approximation). In this arm of the disjunction this alien pneuma is capable of altering the vector in some way, it tries to  makes it more like the concept. The parasite tries to take over the vector. This taking over is very fragile but can produce very strange results from the Narp perspective (paranormality).

The ‘does not obtain’ arm of the disjunction can make use of TV theory insofar as it is actually still a good account of how meaning works, yet in this case the concept never touches the vector but is just our inert approximation of it. This is the normal understanding of things.

Manifestationism says our Narphood is flickering between these two alternatives. Different concepts are variously allied to the two poles. The victory of one pole leaves an easily spiritually perceiving Narp and the victory of the other a harsh materialist.

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