This is the attempt to put down some inchoate reflection that comes to me again and again. When Heidegger speaks of the ‘danger’ in the ‘Question Concerning Technology’ what is the danger? The danger seems to be the way in which this latest epoch of being may close down the voice of Being so that it cannot speak its truth (of time) anymore and that from now on we will only hear the enframing tendency of the technological. As such technology is dangerous to Being. There seems to be something ironical in this (at least insofar as my reflection makes sense) for Heidegger is in a sense one of the first philosophers of the non-human -dasein being subject to the whim of being in many ways. The irony I mean comes from the idea that in order for technology to be dangerous in any meaningful sense it surely must be dangerous to something. We have answered this already though, it is dangerous to Being. But Being in this sense is made possible by dasein existing as a human. One might say that in a sense Heidegger would not care even about dasein other than that it allows being to speak (any being which allows Being to speak would be equally valuable). If though we let through the limited sense that human dasein is required for Being to speak, then this dasein becomes important in this sense. The point is to establish a sense in which this vessel for the speaking of Being is better preserved (according to Heidegger) in one state rather than another. I would like to suggest that this pre-danger state we can call ‘human dasein’. It is almost as if Heidegger believes that the restraints of the human mean that it enables a special relation to Being, one that could be endangered by technological enframing: the openness to the truth can be closed down leaving us perpetually stuck in the mirror of calculative thinking.

People question whether or not he is right in his analysis. I would like to propose that if you think of human-dasein having a kind of incoherent essence then probably he is correct. This seems a strong claim. Heidegger’s yearning for some simpler kind of existence appear often. The peasant in the field, the poet, the homecoming traveller, these motifs all seem to evoke a sense that we would identify with romanticism if we did not know this was not his aim. Heidegger thinks a world is withdrawing. Not just any world, the world possibility for Being as temporality to show itself as itself. The enframing produces enframed time as well as physical space. Being withdraws never to return. The possibility of the simple life and the immediacy of existential temporality seem inextricably linked together. In this sense isn’t he then correct? If you take that kind of human-dasein as the measure, technology as we now even more experience it, eradicates this relation. The relation to nature is only fed back to nature through technological grasping (taking up gardening because it’s good for you, travelling because it is a criterion for self development etc.).  Modern calculative thinking epistemological relations do not allow for this [naive] state to persist. But it isn’t just peasant simplicity that is entailed by this. There is a raft of ideas entailed in our incoherent self-processing that comprise the human accretion. There are no sharp lines here, but the blur is happening right now and last century Heidegger could at least see the old world still partially in place. We are finite, but a section of us is pushing that as hard as we can. We are local, and yet now we are not. The mystery of facticity is replaced the appearance of a scientific necessity. We come to understand (partially thanks to Heidegger) that we are not fixed selves, fixed souls. These naive concepts of existence come unravelled. This incredible mutational event of cybernetic sexual transformation does indeed bring to light the possibility that a human-dasein -a creature knowing its own finitude and yet possessed of an inner authenticity that may escape the idle chatter of the world may retreat. This once creature of community and mores is human more and more if and only if human is just a biological classification.

Ironically the rise of the biological human signals the end of the physically/sexually/culturally/religiously restricted one. This all makes the after human sound incredibly positive. This is not the case. Whilst it is true that Heidegger’s human-dasein is possibly a less laudable entity that he would have us believe, the posthuman-dasein is not necessarily an improvement (insofar as the language of improvement makes any sense). Accelerationism offers no viable alternative for a more satisfying existence. Indeed part of the problem is that an actual satisfying existence is in a sense only possible under the sway of the Heideggerian gods (the role of the mystery) and the acceptance of finitude. There is only speeding towards the inevitability of machinic-transformation or biological-machinic hybridization. Survival modalities of cognition are all that essentially triumph. Left accelerationism solves little as it attempts to preserve Heidegger’s human in community etc using technology to prop this up. The gaping void will be still all too visible.

Of course Heidegger’s human is still with us in vast (most) swathes of the population. Poverty breeds unreflective hand to mouth existence, possibly speckled with moments of something transcendent. Yet even these vast populations are still largely driven by the enframing machine, its power is immense. Heidegger writes in ‘The Question…’ that Holderlin says something to the effect that ‘where the danger lies, there the saving power grows.’ There are two possible versions of ‘the saving power’ I can envisage in this situation (that H might approve of).

One is that the machinic transformation fails (AI does not successfully equal human ability and we reach a limit that we cannot surpass without a yet not visible set of ideas) and miraculously ecological large scale disaster is somehow averted. In this instance the continuing unravelling of human-dasein continues to a point where it is liberated into being (within a certain fleshy finitude) culturally almost anything. The failure of machinic transformation feeds back to generate a kind of non-naive-post-calculative thinking that we cannot yet conceive of. This new way of grasping enables a (for Heidegger) more authentic experience with our temporality and hence Being). Two is that the ecological disaster will render many of the technological systems dysfunctional. Presupposing a) part of the environment is habitable and b) part of this habitable part is available to others than the remainder of a technocapitalist elite then that part of the population barred from remaining technological systems will be forced to engage once more in the joys of labouring hard for its existence and hence(for Heidegger) will regain its connection enabling Being to speak once more.

 

Last year the CEO worked on a small project with the university of Lincoln Architecture dept to commission a piece of work based on the ‘Ship of Theseus’ paradox (as to whether or not the ship is still the real one  if all the pieces of the  ship are slowly replaced until no original pieces remain). The result was a kind of light box that produces a transforming image on the screen. The transformation is brought about the twisting a handle within that rotates a several pieces of wood. This produces two coherent image points (in shadow) with incoherent stages in between.

We would like to make a short issue of Parasol in conjunction with this creation. Pieces of work could be novel kinds of reflection upon the paradox. Poetry, artwork,  theory-fiction and fiction would all be considered. Extra points go to an actual consideration of the piece itself (more video footage information available upon request) though this is not necessary.

Anyone interested please write to ceo47@outlook.com or tweet/dm @23ceo47

There was the possibility that Parasol would end with the Reich issue. However an exciting document was recently received by the CEO that prompted the beginning of a whole issue on the intersecting realm of magick and philosophy.

Through the underground tentacles and popularity of the topic the issue is nearly already full, but if you have a fascinating submission it may yet be accepted -if it’s that good we’ll make room.

Write to ceo47@outlook.com

What is the God of coherence? It may the phantastical answer to some of the issues involved here. Previous posts on manifestationism have drawn attention to the problem of the manifestation of coherence. The issue being that the set of competing ontologies appears to contain the ontology in which concepts are coherent vehicles to contain being. Ambiguities can be ironed out and truth objectively unfolded. This manifestation denies the basic incoherence of concepts upon which the whole meta-theory (manifestationism) is founded.

All this manifestation needs to stay as a part of the extensive set is ironically its incoherent manifestation -incoherent coherence. As it does have this level of sense it remains present. Coherent coherence* is a nonsense. It seems quite obvious this is the case, yet as a phantasy it persists. We can find various ways to show the permeability, the ambiguity of concepts (Derrida, Wittgenstein) yet still the strange possibility that it might all make rigorous proper sense manages to hang on. This phantasy is curiously similar to christian monotheistic notions of God. This similarity is shown in positive theological qualities of God like, perfection, all knowingness etc. From the monotheistic God’s perspective ‘coherence’ is perfectly valid. When we engage in the phantasy of perfect knowledge, the manifestation of coherence, we belong to the lineage of this God. This is not to say one entails the other, though the perfect God ontology does entail the Godlike possibility of perfect knowledge (coherent coherence) but not its human access. Neither does potential human coherent coherence entail the perfect God. No, the connecting point is that they both suppose the possibility of coherent coherence.

*In the TPP a phenomenological epistemology is offered in the following form. The basic relation to a given word-object is an incoherent coherence meaning we accept the word means the object but think no deeper about this. Any thought upon the matter reveals the relation to be an coherent incoherence, i.e. we understand that the fastening of the concept to the phenomena seems in a hard sense essentially impossible. This leaves two remaining relations: incoherent incoherence -which would be outright nonsense- and coherent coherence -the perfect knowledge relation.

 

If Einstein were definitively correct then we should understand that it is more appropriate to say spacetime than space and time. As Buckminster Fuller noted, NAARPs find this very difficult. Our old grammatical inclinations take hold of us so forcefully that we struggle to free ourselves from them. In the case of space and time possibly we should not be so harsh on ourselves. We should remember that the primordial word is always the use word, technical definition comes later.

Time evolves out of multiple instances of phrases like ‘what time is it?’ ‘do you have the time?’ ‘have we enough time?’ all of which hover around a related vector region. The Greeks of course differentiated Chronos from Kairos, sequential time from lived time, Bergson’s time and duration do something similar. The possibility of measuring both space and time in a functional way encourages the grammar of speaking and thinking about them in quantities. This much is not new. However accepting strong accretive theory suggests a feedback that would in unknown ways allow for potentially peculiar temporal rupturing.

The notion of time as its own kind of state, no matter how incoherent will form an accretion. The thinking of time as a spatialesque process creates this accretion. Time is a concept applied to a vector. The vector is the endlessly changing vector field -which includes our mind (if everything froze but we continued to think, we would be aware that at least for us, time was still going, or we would be comfortable in saying so at least).

This endless flux gives us the grammar of time as if it were a force that moved things on. The incoherent accretion of time with all its gods and physics plugs into the flux vector. If magick obtains (strong accretive theory) then this accretion will in some minor sense make the time vector more like the accretion.

This is the doubling process often referred to in here in which the original use impression of the vector transforms into something of a more concrete nature -the accretion. In the case of time we have the changing nature of everything as the vector which enables the grammar of time. Time is not a thing, it is born out of this use description. The solidification of the concept around the more quantitative meaning renders the concept more in this wise. Time as a thing is an accretion of the various uses of it. Accretions are the means by which we alter things with magick. The ordinary function of the accretions is that they fit the vector that they are used for -the meaning of grammar.

Magick as we have said is the application of an accretion to a vector that would not usually grammatically receive  it. The time accretion we take to fit the vector flux but when we utilise the time accretion more in the direction of measurement we enact this kind of magick upon the flux. As with all magick the effect is subtle and scarcely repeatable.

This is the irony of the time accretion. The rupture is not enabling the strangeness of the flux, the rupture is in the attempt to repress the potential strangeness of the flux.

Here we hit again the problem of umbratic magick vs pneuminous magick or ruptures that belong to the restraint (are in its nature) and ruptures that may be brought about by conceptual levels of intense pneuminosity.

Synchronicity looks like ruptures that happen at the pneuminous level -because they appear intentional. However one must consider the possibility that the pneuminous accretion of time in its increasingly measured nature is actually repressive to a potential stranger temporality which it -albeit slightly- controls.

All systems need a patch. It’s inescapable. The previously exposed flaw in manifestationism can only be displaced by meta-meta level (since manifestationism itself is a kind of meta-philosophy). The problem with manifestationism is that it must presuppose the incoherence of concepts in order to stay afloat. It is the incoherence of concepts that means they will always have aporias which enemy agents may successfully twist to their own advantage. The incoherence of concepts guarantees the perpetual argument of philosophy especially, but to some extent all disciplines/knowledge claims. Manifestationism contains the extensive set of ontologies -extensive because it excludes many utterly arbitrary choices that have no mythological or otherwise grounding to them. However one reasonable theory of how things might be entails that the concepts are not incoherent hence manifestationism contains within itself an ontology that denies the ground on which the meta-theory itself is formed. This is clearly untenable.

To solve (patch) this situation, we propose an agnostic disjunction that occurs before manifestationism occurs. This AD would be the choice between the coherence or the incoherence of concepts. It is admittedly a somewhat bizarre one as it does put forward the possibility that concepts could be coherent which is a notion that does not even seem to clear in itself. Nevertheless it can seem to us that the possibility exists that clear definitions could be made for all notions and hence the manifestation is allowed to pass. If it could be shown a priori that this was not a possibility then manifestationism could get of the ground on this merit alone. For the moment though this possibility seems unavailable, furthermore it seems better to include the possibility of coherence as a manifestation than to attempt to prove it can be exclude. Doing this avoids the problem of attempting to exclude a system on conceptual grounds of argumentation whilst simultaneously proposing that conceptual argumentation can never close down any extensive possibility.

In a sense this still keeps the manifestationist picture intact as there is still nothing but competing ontologies. What it does do that’s different is create a two tier system in which the first agnostic disjunction must be answered. A complicating question regards the possibility of incoherence and coherence is that of magick. The desired end would be that magick would not be compatible with the notion of coherence. This however is not the case. The magickal possibility is perfectly compatible with the phantasy of coherence it’s just that this is not the chaos magickal model. The version of magick that is compatible with coherence is the older version of fixed correspondences as set into existence by some higher power. This hidden but real order of existence is part of the coherence that might uncovered. This more hardline version of magick can also be found within incoherent manifestationism but in coherent coherence it is the only form possible. There is then admittedly a bizarre coherent phantasy embedded in manifestationism.

In other places we have stated that in order to describe pneuminosity as a philosophy we must assume the reality of (chaos) magick. The situation is now that we must first of all assume the incoherent arm of the primordial agnostic disjunction and then the reality of chaos magick.

These really are notes. I’m totally aware that most of the interest herein is for the paranormal related writings, I would point out however that unless one accepts a magickal ontology blindly, then something like manifestationism follows as a wider picture. It does sound like more regular (meta)philosophy but that’s because that’s what it is. The whole point of this project is that magick taken seriously has wide epistemological implications.

  1. Manifestationism is empirically driven insofar as it pays attention to the fact that no given ontology has been able to totalise the territory. Of course there are many relatively stable knowledge claims. The chief empirical realm for manifestationism is philosophy -which is notorious for failing to establish anything. The manifestationist claim would probably be that other kinds of epistemic claims are not immune to the problem of philosophy, they are just less prone to them.
  2. Manifestationism must in this sense presuppose an ontology of concepts with permeable borders. It is in this sense self defeating. It begs the question insofar as it presupposes that knowledge is of a certain nature in order to show the consequence of this. This is a legitimate criticism, however manifestationism can still go through under this presupposition as it represents an ironically extremely stable notion. This notion is that of incoherence. A notion that natural language concepts are well defined would deny a strong version of manifestationism. This too is of course a manifestation. We might want to say that no one would believe such a thing, that no one could be an agent for such an idea, yet we know this is possible. This creates a further irony: Manifestationism is founded on the idea that theories cannot agree and cannot remove each other (to a greater and lesser degree) because concepts are incoherent in their nature. The problem with it is that is possible to have a manifestation that denies manifestationism. Such a manifestation denies the ground on which it is founded. Such a manifestation is necessarily only a competitor for the nature of concepts. Yet by its existence it shows manifestationism failure of self grounding, subjecting it to its own problem. The irony is in the fact that it is a manifestation of stability that destabilizes the picture.
  3. Manifestationism proposes that the answer to any form of enquiry is a competing ontology (manifestation) amongst others. Sometimes this dominance is quite extreme.

Horizons on which phenomena are interpreted:

  • Scientific horizon:  Certainty in one register is altered in others e.g. element behaviour in different atmospheric conditions (water boils at different temperatures at different pressures. This is generally the most stable epistemic arena.
  • Linguistic horizon: When one uses a word, we don’t know what kinds of vector might fulfil the use meaning in the future.
  • Metaphysical horizon: No propositions of any grammatical certainty exist in this realm. All such phenomena are agnostic disjunctive. Keeping ADs open requires that the phenomena not be closed down easily by rational competing ontologies. Powerful paranormal experiences need very convincing rational reductive explanations to remove them (the classic contention here being that at least for synchronicity this is not possible). Is ‘metaphysical’ sufficient for a catch all phenomena in this bracket? Are there grounds to differentiate theological issues from paranormal ones. Theological issues in some sense arise from pure faith, however they often presuppose historical paranormal phenomena that act as grounding events for the faith. There is a kind of difference that maybe warrants a subdivision system: Metaphysical: I) Theological II) Paranormal. Even though in practice the difference is minimal. Extreme putative reality altering can result in extreme manifestations taking over. Psychotropic substances can provide criteria for accepting various metaphysical ontologies.
  • Social horizon: What happened in day to day events? Who took the cheese? There is a temporal horizon for such phenomena insofar as whatever has happened recedes. We consider these problems as operating under regular reality criteria -circumstances must be extreme for us to start to consider a ghost took the cheese.
  • Awareness horizon: What is the status of being that is not within our awareness? Is being in the dark different to being in the light? Two different but related problems that show the connectedness of darkness and the umbratic. That is, light can still be out of our awareness.
  • Trust horizon: Naarps trust the accounts each other give of phenomena. This occurs in all spheres. Direct perception is a special case that pertains to the general issue of magick insofar as they believe they should not readily doubt their own experience. The problem is that their own experience is already governed by various occupying manifestations. What do they mean when they say they trust themselves?

In the site we call the Naarp, how is it determined which manifestations successfully occupy the territory? Is it possible to say anything about this without ascribing an ontology to the self?

Some basic manifestations of the self are:

  • the  soul which contingently occupies the body
  • the soul which necessarily occupies the body
  • the self which is formed by empirical relation to the body and experience (broadly nuture)
  • the self which is determined largely by the body (broadly nature)
  • the self which is in roughly equal parts bodily determined and experientially so
  • the epiphenomenal self which is not real as such but just an appearance of a controlling self
  • no self, multiplicity of powers occupying a region
  • cogent self as a power competing amongst others in a region

Manifestationism cannot solve the problem of the self or any problem of positive epistemology. This is not its purpose.

The temptation is to forge a quasi manifestationist philosophy that allows a number of presuppositions e.g. the incoherence thesis and the accretive thesis. These accepted the pneuminous accretive theory is a cogent manifestation of all phenomena. It does then though become dicatorial in paranormal acceptance. This seems wrong and dogmatic which returns the manifestationist agenda by the agnostic disjunctive door. That is any acceptance of paranormality must also face the possibility of its not obtaining (alternative explanations).

 

This is just a series of notes trying to put down some reflections on the matter in an attempt to try to make the theory more functional in its explanatory value.

1) Manifestationism attempts to describe a situation of quasi epistemological relativism in which ontologies compete for territory against each other.

2) We are the space in which this occurs. This invokes the issue that the ‘we’ itself must equally be recognised as equally a site for ontological competition e.g. are we ensouled, NAARPs, purely material etc.?

3) A recent proposal was made that a basic tripartite structure of:

i) Social descriptions

ii) Scientific descriptions

iii) Metaphysical descriptions

might give a basic doorway into how the manifestations function. It does broaden the notion of a manifestation but this is not a problem as the theory most certainly is supposed to be epistemologically relevant at any level.

4) “Was it you that gave her the book?” someone asks. I reply that it wasn’t me but they doubt this is the case, they believe that it was me that gave her the book and that it was not Jessica (who to my mind did give her the book). This other subject has reasons for believing the account of the event that they hold to. These are not full blown ontologies as we would think of them, just regional contingent issues. Nevertheless they are interesting insofar as they show regular reality level epistemic problems. If Steve has gone home and won’t admit to having given her the book and the other subject thinks I did it, they might very well not know it with much certainty but it might be the theory they are invested in. In the manifestationist sense, this subject-region (NAARP) is occupied by certain conceptual powers that determine this theory. These might be something like ‘a distrust of myself’ ‘a belief that I have done something similar before’ etc. They are part of a regional theory of me, an ontology of what I am in this social sense (an entity not to be trusted). This regional ontology is still a mini manifestation that competes in the territory with others. As a side note this does seem to hint at the potential at least ethical correctness of Korzybski insofar as the static sense of being (an ontology) is guiding a general impression rather than being only a singular instance (I am untrustworthy as opposed to I may have exhibited untrustworthy behaviour).

5) If I go on a diet, a particular diet that I’ve read about for a certain health benefit various things are going on here that may serve to illustrate the matter. I believe the diet is correct and I read about the nutritional science behind it. There are conflicting accounts in the science. But my friend has told me this diet is great and I trust them so I may generally try to not allow the competing account much traction, believing instead the possibly dubious references about the efficacy of the diet. The diet is also part of a quasi new age belief that hold that certain ‘negative energies’ will be removed from me by my assiduous following of it. My alliance with my friend has allowed me to take the diet idea in, maybe I’ve complained about something and they’ve suggested it. They’ve then given  me evidence of an anecdotal nature that’s taken  hold. I’ve tried to rationally reinforce it but encounter an agnostic disjunction insofar as I cannot capably disentangle the conflicting science accounts. I might be open to the notion of energetic cleansing but the discourse is entirely metaphysical. My friend insists upon the reality of it. I might seriously doubt this. But then following the diet feel a curious emotional levity. Do I ascribe this to maybe an increase in omega 3s or to a metaphysical alleviation of ‘negative energy’? The synchronicity like problem emerges. I might want to reduce the sensation rationally but I cannot be sure that the metaphysically described energy release has not taken place -as I have no criteria to test this by. But I may be convinced of this by the strange levity which I believe cannot be purely nutritionally based. This may also be true from another perspective insofar that the very idea of the energy cleansing may have had some kind of placebo like neural-hormonal feedback (this is clearly related to a weak-pneuminous theory/hyperstitional interpretation).

6) The diet and its interaction with me is a complex dynamic interplay of competing manifestations which in this case cross the full range. A social anecdotal power in relation to whatever issue I may have (which in itself may be a health related issue given to me from the modern variety of health paranoias). I seek to reinforce this power with acceptable knowledge (science) but am  potentially hampered by my alliance to my friend and the appearance equivalence in evidence (competing ontologies). The metaphysical claims of the system are partially validated and thus interpreted positively, I am unable to disprove them even with competing accounts. Because they already exist as ontological possibility (phantasy) they are not removed from the system by simply demonstrating an alternative even when the alternative is more rational (where rational means those manifestations we are able to test).

7) Does this point to an inadequacy of language. To the inadequacy of ontology? It does suggest ontology has a home. To predicate one thing of another as a cogent relation may not always be the best way of expressing it -cf the Korzybski point above. But ontology returns even if we want a process ontology.

8) The suggestion is that any given phenomena may be analysed by means of the competing ontologies that make it up. Ergo a total description does not rely upon an ontology to ground it because a total description must take into account that the ontologies in their plurality cannot be overcome. The emergence of individual points insofar as there is more than one (contra the solipsistic manifestation) dialectically creates sceptical situations on multiple levels that necessarily prohibit the dominance of any central ontology even though one (science generated) ontology may actually be correct. The question is then how far a given ontology could dominate the territory and create minimal dissonance within the system. The multiple feedbacks seem to make this difficult. A purely present at hand ontology that was true and satisfactory might still generate phenomenological contradictions that create disbelief in the ontology. This potentially ironically could only be resolved if the reality was something like the strong pneuminous model. That is, if it were true that reality were solid and fixed the synchronicity problem would most likely still remain. I cannot envisage how it could be extirpated but we could accept the possibility. However if it were true that the pneuma fedback ontologically into the umbra then this (as a scientific ontology) would be a more readily acceptable. Why? Because with evidence of a genuine relation of conceptuality and physical experience at a level of physics we could better process that this was a continuous experience of conceptual feedback as opposed to the notion that conceptual feedback is an anomaly (synchronicity/informational interference).

 

The theosophists Leadbetter and Besant described certain occult perceptions of thought forms. These thought forms were described and in some instances they were committed to paper. The basic idea is that all thought content has this a kind of substantial existence on the levels of fine matter, this matter is perceivable by various persons, either through natural ability or occult training. Thought forms we are informed, have a dual nature. One aspect of it radiates out from the NAARP and may effect others in the vicinity, whereas the other creates a static entity that is attached to the NAARP. This thought being may be of greater or lesser consequence to the NAARP. Purely transient thoughts will have only a minor auric impact but more traumatic or even positive (narcissistic) ones may be more prone to repetition. Powerful thought forms become more powerful each time they are engaged with. The idea is that the thought form is attached to the NAARP aura and essentially waits for the neurotic accretion (self) to reactivate it. Each reactivation reinforces it. NAARPs have many such thought forms embedded in their auras and their spiritual existence is contingent on their engaging in meditation like techniques to clear reduce their influence. The impact of a thought form is theosophically generally negative.

What strikes me is that, if we bracket off the ontological descriptions of the occult world in theosophy (the auric levels, the attributions, the planes of existence etc.) the thought form description is actually very close to the pneuminous accretive notion found herein. The accretive model is supposed to be a kind of phenomenology of the possibility of magickal interactions, no occult perceptions are utilised in its description other than as examples to be questioned. That is, I try to lay everything out by inference. The occult perceptions/phenomena only allow us to ask what might condition them. The conclusion has been that if we reject the denial of such phenomena then we should admit an essentially chaos magickal ontology that suggests a purely informational world (the pneuma) that may, under the right conditions, alter a more rigid underpinning (the umbra).

The thought form model has a high degree of similarity to the strong accretive model. Both posit the autonomy of conceptual entities external to the NAARP and their ability to effect the world. The descriptions by Leadbetter of the way in which the thought forms are scattered about places and people is highly resonant with the way in which the accretive notion is supposed to function. Incoherent pneuminous accretive structures are literally everywhere. Leftover bits of NAARPs, vector imprintations, traumas, ecstacies all lie around in an immanent intersecting pneuminous space where spatio-temporality means very little (my conceiving of last Wednesday literally connects to last Wednesday). The dual aspect described by the theosophists correlates well to the accretion itself and to the pneuminous threads that radiate out of it connecting it to other accretions in this a-spatio-temporal way

As one occult manifestation amongst many there is no reason to pay particular attention to the theosophical ontology unless one wanted to do so for an exercise. The accretive theory does not tell you (unlike theosophy) that you should remove attached accretions in order to reveal a more pure self -as this kind of instruction moves beyond its remit. What the theosophical picture does powerfully evoke though is the way in which we may have had a focus or a sense of control taken from us by the attachment of many such accretive forms. This summons a phenomenological potentially constructed sense of desire for freedom. The way forward is problematic. Without being able to posit any greater power without the accretive encumberance we have no reason to say if it even makes any sense to strip down the NAARP to a more precise entity. The gamble though would be not unlike the Pascalian belief in the magickal world itself (we lose little by acknowledging it but potentially gain a lot). To behave as if we strive to become disencumbered by unruly thought patterns, (even if one more layer of illusion) if possible actually liberates us from these powers, whereas submission only repeats the status quo.

 

The charge is often levelled that we reify thing-vectors as such largely because our consciousness perceives things only at a certain temporal speed. Process philosophy and early versions of this (like Goethe) point out how we can use mental effort to overcome static perception and perceive dynamism instead. There may well be something to this though whether or not it justifies Goethean claims to see things as they really are or not is another matter. What I want to propose here is that the stasis that is imposed upon the things is an accretive formation whose root lies not especially in their temporal appearance as continuous but rather in the accretive projection from the NAARP. That is, it is the self identity which presents itself as secure that is projected upon the vectors to enable their perception as similarly secure. This is not to say the stability of things is not a strong component that also feeds into the consistency identity of the self, only that the consistency of the self as strived for is also projected upon the externality (it goes both ways).

The self is described as a neurotic accretion-assimilation, though the assimilation part is precisely what is missing its self phenomenology. The neurotic accretion appears to itself as consistently contained under a name -the name given to the NAARP. This perpetuity of name is what the accretion is formed around. Of course the neurotic accretion is not consistent, it is often wildly not so, yet it rationalises its behaviour usually by protesting that the fleshy regional-processor influenced its rational control. There is some truth to this, yet the deep inconsistencies that emit from many NAs betray that pneuminous accretive war lies just beneath the surface. In many NAARPs the NA’s control is slender. Yet the necessary appearance for sanity to be maintained is precisely that the NA is in control and that the NA is the same. The presentation of self-identity of the NA to itself is crucial and erroneous -a Nietzschean necessary illusion. This self identity  is reinforced by the temporal consistency of things but also projected upon them. The ironic result is that the NA is reinforced in its appearance by reflection of the most solid aspects of things which it uses to repress its own natural dynamism. Of course the picture is not exhausted here for the mirroring accretive action serves to strive to create the solidity that is perceived. That is, because accretions actually affect things and are not inert, when the NA perceives itself as the same, as consistent, it creates a pneuminous force that seeks to contain the NA into exactly this kind of consistency. Thus the system exists in a perpetual struggle. It is of course a perfect correlate that the magickal systems endlessly point out the virtue of destabilising the self. This is not the point here though it is related. It is suggested here that the at least partial cause of the reification of things is the projection of self identity upon the the externality as further confirmation that the NA is consistent. Such things are effective vectors for this projection as opposed to the body which can be seen to alter. To treat seriously the alteration of the body would be damaging to the NA’s self presentation of identity and hence is not useful for this process. Hence the accretion of stability gained by the self identity is projected to emphasise stable longevity and not transience -the oft pointed to failure of consciousness to readily perceive process.