In this informal chat Charles Johns, editor of The Neurotic Turn, tries to describe his two philosophical terms ‘neurosis’ and ‘assimilation’. He also tries to explain why he thinks these descriptions become necessarily disclosed and why they are necessarily prevalent in our current epoch (for example the exclusion of the definition of neurosis in the 1980’s within the D.S.M created a repressed symptom, or, the uprise of mass-conformism and iphone narcissism shows a larger more acceptable state of neurosis etc).

It is a testament to the situation that I feel embarrassed writing this. However part of my writing has always been anecdotal as I feel this helps it hook [the theory] to experience. My wife was raising swiftlings that had fallen from nests. This task is somewhat harrowing as they have to be ready to go before the other swifts leave -swifts are here in the UK for 12 weeks approx. There were three; after some weeks of nurture one swift successfully took off, but the other two looked weren’t looking hopeful. One kept trying to fly but just couldn’t, it would flutter and drop to the ground whilst the other would make no attempt to leave. All the swifts left the sky bar two, that clearly would leave any day now. Things looked desperate and I felt for both wife and swifts (as they have to be put to sleep if they wouldn’t fly). Such situations like all those of a degree of despair call for requests from transcendent powers. In organised religion it’s called prayer, otherwise it’s magick/sorcery -whatever you will (no pun intended).

I did nothing elaborate but retrospectively I can see it ticks the chaos magickal boxes. As I lay in bed before sleep I went with my quite poor visualization skills to see the swift God[dess] to ask for help in encouraging it’s children to take flight. Frankly I can’t remember a lot of what happened. In truth all I know is that I woke up in the morning and had completely forgotten about it. Fairly early I must have driven off to do some early morning task. As I returned up my street I met the aforementioned wife walking up it towards me looking around as she went. I pulled up and she told me that both the swifts had gone and flown down this road. She was extremely surprised at this as one (the fluttering one) had been deemed hopeless from suspected damaged air sacks and the other was still extremely timid only yesterday. However on the first attempt to release them both had flown straight away. She was now checking the gardens down the street in case they had crashed, but could not see them anywhere.

It was only at this point that I actually remembered my previous night’s supplication. The wave of excited shock is one I have had before but so far for me it is scarcely less strange each time. Maybe there is some inuring that comes with the possibility being accepted at all, but otherwise the reality rupture affect (yes I mean affect) is still is quite profound.

This is the moment. This is the same sensation that all of this is about. The point is not to tell you that the swift spirit is real and can help your injured swiftlings or indeed any spirit is ‘real’. The message is the same: existence shows itself in such a way that it can appear that informational actions (what I call pneuminous) can affect the restraint of the everyday world (the umbratic). It is completely understood that the above anecdote can represent nothing more than chance. The swifts were due to leave, maybe they were pushed to action by their own innate knowledge that it was time to go. However, in order to be certain that it was chance I must know the how things are with apodicticity (as opposed to apodidaeity (swift joke)).  If I do not know this then in asserting chance as the truth, I beg the question by helping myself to the assumption of a materialist ontology in order to deny the possibility of magick.

This moment is the same one that discloses manifestationism, not as a meta-philosophy as such (though it is one) but more as the very nature of our relation to how we accept what things are. Ontologies compete for our attention. As agents we work for various ontologies. Agnostic disjunction means that we have to choose in order to act, though the choice is only by virtue of what ontology (accretion) we work for. Philosophy in this sense shatters the naivety of being and agent of the truth. Of course many NARPs believe they exactly are that i.e. that they are working for the true ontology. Without the agnostic disjunctive/manifestationist insight anyone can end up as a dogmatic agent of an ontology. Laruelle achieves something similar with the notion of ‘philosophical decision’ but somehow seems to close ontology down non-philosophically. Non-philosophy is not a meta-philosophy, manifestationism in part definitely is -though it is an immanent one. Philosophy (this philosophy) means recognising the agnostic disjunction wherever it pops up so you may ask ‘why am I an agent for this choice?’

Paranormal phenomena are special because the nature of these events perpetually keeps the manifestationist agenda open. Paranormality can only be drawn into science as legitimate, it cannot be defeated by it. Any attempt by a ruling ontology to define away such events, results in the same question begging problem outlined above, this psychologically manifests in mistrust of authority -a similar pattern is found in competing political ontologies, where dominant democratic capitalist accretions become doubted by their agents (and begin to lose them). Post truth is one such consequence.

I want to say there is something wrong with certain accelerationist trends that overly fetishise and glorify technology but I can’t really. Not without committing myself as an agent of an untenable naturalism. I can feel though the power of that accretion in its appeal, Srnicek and Williams call it ‘folk politics’ and find it as untenable as I do. What I do think though is that there is some kind of tendency created by the fetishised techno-accelerationist coolness to reject common natural aesthetic beauty. Obviously ‘natural’ is a difficult , what I mean by it though is something maybe approaching the term biophilia. This too is inadequate as I feel what I mean would also encompass the stones and the weather and not just the fauna and flora. There has to be a way to not overly romanticise and yet learn from the romantics. Heidegger was close to this. A magickally open ontology that can harmonise the technological/accelerationist aura (in Benjamin’s sense) and simultaneously permit the NARP’s engagement with ‘nature’ is required.

A suitable accretion that harmonises these two tendencies is of course, the swift.

It’s a heuristic. It has to be. The description must contain that impossible realm that Heidegger and Laruelle try to get to. It appears as the given, as facticity, as the one. The problem is immediately the hermeneutic structure of all things. What must be posited is an incoherent border that partially maps onto natural kinds and artifacts. Both are pneuma as both are informational. What is posited is a self giving spatio-temporality that manifests as pneuma necessarily (since this our element). This isn’t present at hand because it isn’t theoretical, but it is what the present at hand comes to analyse and posit as real. This is close to Laruelle’s one, if not identical. An actuality that is untheorisable that in fact emerges first as the ready to hand. This is what gives rise to the word-accretion that then enables present at hand reflection.

What is fascinating is that it seems that this stage shows only a pre-ontological solidity -because immanence only displays this (maybe this is questionable). It takes higher pneuminous structures to show magick as possibility. That is the the pre-ontological showing cannot comment ontologically. This maybe the pre-manifestational breakthrough.

If we hold that traces exist in the pneuma then the hyperstitional zhgli will unfold into clues and possibly temporal coordinates that may act as further gateways. The pneumatology is a system designed to deal not just with the philosophical implications of magick but also with practical decoding situations like this one.

Each letter in turn means thus:

Z is the 22nd letter/day entitled Being, two accreted beings are swans and willows.

H is the 7th letter/day called Lovers/incest. Hawthorn and goldfinches herald its presence. Clearly it seems to hint at the sysgy as  mentioned in the zhgli post.

G is 6th letter/day. It is called Mithras. Ivy and Spiders, dualities, Dodos, twin peaks belong to G

L is the 11th letter day. Entitled Freedom, Rowans, Ducks and snakes feature

I is 8th letter day named Isis (from which its opposite Mithras as decoded to Dodo (do do). Yew trees and dogs are here.

The extra symbolism may be extraneous. Let us just lay the meanings out as a sentence.

Being lovers (incest) Mithras freedom Isis.

This hints at a further revealing surely like:

Being lovers incest Mithras’ freedom is [is].

We have here an intimation that within the a unity of love, Mithras (ambiguous as a force of revelation and revelry) freedom is allowed to be.

This overall positivity must not however overlook the under erasure incest which tells us something about the love. We must also refrain from calling this the negative because non-incest does not even happen. There is something though internally restraining in this power, this may be the hint.

Further unfolding is definitely required.

 

 

Why Laruelle? The question is a clue. It does not need answering, rather it needs decoding. The decoding is the placing of the ‘why’ at the end of Laruelle so that we have ‘Laruelle-why’. But this too has not unlocked the mystery. This ‘why’ of the question is transformed to its phonetic ‘y’ thus we have ‘Laruelle-y’. Is this a coordinate? Possibly, though here even this coordinate option is barred as we make a simpler move. This move is to emphasise the common pronunciation of a ‘y’ at the end of a word; this is of course the ‘ee’ sound. The resulting structure is the word ‘Laruelly’.  How are we to proceed from this point? Does this new word mean a follower of the non-philosopher? Maybe it does and maybe both the laruellee as follower and the Laruelle-y coordinate will have their day. This however is not today. The next move is one of confirmation, indeed the whole sequence has been one of confirmation. We look to a rhyming move to achieve the next step, this rhyme is: Laruelly-Jelly. Jelly indeed was where we were heading. For jelly came up in a recent Laruelle seminar as the best understanding we were able to forge of the one. There is though one last transformation to make, that of jelly to non-jelly, this is pronounced jelly but spelled zhgli.

Zhgli is the one.

Laruelle[y] is priori zhgli.

One cannot help but hear the adventitious ring of ‘syzygy’ in the spontaneously created zhgli. The conjunction of the oppositions seems resonant of overcoming the philosophical schism, or maybe it is itself a clue the zhgli is not the one and we have gone astray.

But zghli is a One (or maybe A1 (is the A1 La Rue Elle?)). Maybe it is only a resonance, and there is no syzygy in zhgli. However there are moments where no matter whether one is rightly or wrongly conceiving the matter, Laruelle serves the zhgli.

The zhgli conception is that moment of conceiving that you, the air, the table, your colleagues around the table, the chairs, the biscuits and the floor are the continuous zhgli. This tells you nothing about the nature of the zhgli, it seems to adhere to what Laruelly wants to say -there are no relations in the zhgli, there are no objects and no events. It seems to intimate the conception of non-information as raised in a post on the umbra.

There seems something ironic in this conception bearing in mind Bertrand Russell once likened Hegel’s thought to jelly where here nontology has become zhgli. The problem does seem raised as to where the informational relation has gone if it did not qualify to remain in the zhgli reduction. Maybe this is a misunderstanding but it seems that the contingent names, discussions, meaningful noises are not in zhgli as meaning. This would be how pneuminosity differs. In a theory where the information is substantialised (becomes pneuma), the zhgli too would show the pneuma in all its accreted messy glory. A pneuminous zhgli!

Iaaaaa!

Manifestationism  is something like a meta-philosophy. The basic notion is that no ontological position can be shown to be correct, or rather that no position at all can be said to out manoeuvre its competitors. As such it does not simply apply to ontology but to any field of competing notions. There is some difference in the realm of scientific competition insofar as the resistance that emits from that nebulous way in which the things determine the concepts (umbratic resistance) means the language game of truth is more appropriate i.e. I am ill advised to continue to believe in Aristotlean physics after Galileo. This resistance does not exist in philosophy, we try in vain to find it by logical argument and a prioricity but it will not show. Manifestationism then applies better in this realm. Any possibility in ethics, epistemology, ontology, philosophy of mind is a manifestation. We might currently postulate that the primary manifestations, at least in metaphysics are monism, pluralism, idealism and realism. If we say all others are derivatives and recombinations of these this is not to belittle the power of the endless new manifestations, they are as unique as the primordial and once in the fray are never to leave it.

Here we are concerned with what grounds this kind of approach. There are two primary reasons for manifestationism. The first is in fact empirical: it is the surveying of the historical proliferation of philosophy and the observation that, whilst it does develop, its history is perpetually there for reintegration or reinvigoration as a possibility -at least in those areas that were not tied to science and thus receive actually persuasive grounds for no longer being tenable (though even these may return). The second is the a priori  argument from incoherence. This states that all concepts have incoherent edges to some extent or another. Philosophical concepts unlike some scientific ones have a high degree of incoherence. This leaves them prone to multiple layers of ambiguity. These multiple and undecidable possibilities of interpretation mean that e.g. if one person is advocating a certain interpretation of Kant and another is disavowing it, both parties will find adequate reason to defend their respective points of view without there existing the possibility of a substantial enough authority to make some fresh headway in the matter. In the language used elsewhere on this site, each Narp is agent for interpretation rather than an objective advocate for it.

It is in fact hard to argue with manifestationism as presented thusly, that is without proclaiming that your philosophy is in fact absolutely correct (and thus appearing a touch dogmatic). Of course an agent of a given set of ideas may be exactly disposed to this kind of belief: an agent of a single thought. What if one is an agent of manifestationism? This doesn’t seem possible since agency itself is a product of a philosophy and thus subscribes one to an ontology.

But still there is an interesting question to explore here: If we want to think as manifestationists how are we to conceive of whatever the Narp/subject is? Why are some Narps (let’s carry on calling them Narps, just because we need a word, though accepting that the term is tied to a theoretical framework) expressing favouritism towards some conceptual structures? How can we express any understanding of this without falling into a manifestation? Is this not an actual limit on thought? Of course here we can feel Laruelle’s enterprise pressing against us, for it is exactly such an escape he would like to make. Indeed the possibility of manifestationism’s coherently saying anything further may well legitimise the possibility that Laruelle actually escapes manifestationism.

There are two manifestations in evidence at this stage: either the Narps create the manifestations or the manifestations are in some sense already existent and just found by the Narps. This is obviously a kind of Aristotlean vs Platonic schema. An awful circularity appears. How can we say anything about either without lapsing into privileging a manifestation. You cannot is the simple answer. this is a dead end agnostic disjunction.

Does manifestationism though have anything built into it as a kind of entailment? Maybe. Manifestationism states not how things are but how an epistemically limited Narp cannot determine what is correct hence in some kind of informational territory -where information manifests as a necessary relation between a minimal binary state.

Laruelle’s non-philosophy is something that I am thinking through and with at the moment. I will refrain from trying to reduce his ideas or even properly describe them (I am still struggling!). What I wish to do however is suggest how his thinking chimes with certain areas of my philosophy of neurosis and assimilation, and, what I see as an implicit escape route which he sketches out (he would probably disagree with this escape however).

Regarding his belief in a ‘real science’ that works with ‘absolute immanent data’, which comes before philosophy, and regarding the unilateral relationship Being has with ‘The One’ – the problem doesn’t seem to be one of ‘objectivity’ (he denies that his work is initially advocating this) but of a kind of Heideggerian ‘clearing’ ; the ‘space’ between the pure affectivity of philosophical thinking (the ‘decision’) and that of ‘radical immanence’ (the One before identity).

At least for the sake of this post I can see two common operations of thinking this clearing; one of exaggerating and one of distancing. I believe Laruelle does both (and myself too), but whereas my form of distancing is more Derridean (allowing concepts/signifieds to play with themselves or qua the productions of differences beyond that of present-at-hand experience/discourse), Laruelle’s distancing is more from the realist/scientific spirit ( i.e how can I make a meta- discourse that defines human perception/how can I make a meta-discourse that shows the former’s redundancy or inability to encounter ‘the real’?). This ‘realist’ distancing in Laruelle is not simply problematic because of those famous critiques of realism (From Kant to Heidegger) but also because he advocates BOTH scientific progression (regarding the scientific status of the real) AND a form of mysticism, in his words – ‘this outside is an immanent a priori that cannot be conflated, related or totalized (by philosophical thinking)’. Obviously traditional epistemology (or philosophical thinking) is not what is going to get us to the ‘outside’ (even though this ‘outside is immanent), but one of my claims is that the ‘believability’ and ‘use’ of ‘decisional thinking’ (neurosis) may want to tell us that it can. It may not simply tell us that it can but can also simulate (or assimilate) a form of reality that conforms to such thinking (and of socio-political-material reality). The point here is not to argue that decisional thinking (neurosis) creates reality, or that it has to necessarily effect the real, but simply that the realist-scientist or non-philosopher cannot absolutely vanquish this operation of thought. For all of Laruelle’s acceptance of ‘cloning’ (cloning the real) he doesn’t explain how one floats above all these clones to achieve the proper untarnished axioms.

The operation of exaggerating in order for the Heideggerean clearing is common in philosophy. Kant could be seen to exaggerate in his theory of the ‘transcendental aesthetic’; by constituting a realm of sensibility/representations which dialectically points to a field outside of such (the ‘thing in itself’). The philosophical theory of neurosis exaggerates the experience of human thought (defining such as neurotic) by bringing out key features of thought-production (desire/obsession-compulsion, repetition, trauma/memory, disturbance of thoughts, awareness of thoughts) in the hope that such thoughts constitute rather than inhibit a ‘subject’.

Laruelle makes a move of exaggeration by stating that ‘thinking’ is ‘imaginary’ or ‘illusorily self-sufficient’. By describing thinking, the decision and philosophy as ostensibly subsisting unilaterally from ‘The One’ he exaggerates the field of human affectivity to the point where it becomes an asymmetrical epiphenomenon. That thought can generate and auto-produce without starting from ‘the real’ or ‘the one’ chimes well with theories of autopoiesis (systems that reproduce and maintain themselves regardless of both larger or smaller factors/determinations). Again, it is a theory of neurosis that affirms this; the concept may have only a minimal relation (or no relation proceeding the relation) to a ‘real’ or even a conventional socio-historical reality. A concept can relate to other concepts either aleatorically, through the subjects neurosis or through the discreet history of conceptual systems without laying claim to a reality or even a conventional use. This is the concepts autonomous or tautological power, but Laruelle claims that this ‘auto-cloning’ is not ‘real’ (conflating illusion with what is unilaterally/asymmetrically produced but not caused qua ‘The One’) whilst a theory of neurosis would be content in saying that ‘reality’ is both a use term (“did you watch that reality T.V show last night?) and also that reality is simply assimilated in the last instance (or that reality is one assimilation of many planes of assimilation).

If there is any import in stating that reality is unilateral (Laruelle) then the most illuminating question (instead of attempting to undermine this or simply disavow it) would be to ask how the realm of thinking and the realm of radical immanence co-exist  (think Descartes dualism). For example, is there a clue in Laruelle’s language;  there seems to be an un-approximated distance and intimacy of ‘The One’ that destroys the relative constitution of representations and their signifieds (the impossibility and idealism of deconstruction). In other words, is Laruelle’s critique of words and deconstruction (and his use of ‘representationalism’ as solely a pragmatic enterprise) a way of disclosing an experience that not only does away with the reduction and positivism of representationalism (a critique that Bergson and Deleuze have already made) but also of the notion that words, concepts and other possible entities do NOT exist solely as or through representations (signifieds) but only as a unilateral side-effect of the prior ‘vision-as-one’ (i.e radical immanence and universality)?

Reflections on the notion of the agnostic disjunction -as displaying options between two or more manifestations- reveal that it must be not just theoretical discussion point but a feature of Narp existence. What is this flickering between options? Here we almost seem to hit the connection between pneuma and manifestationism. Certainly we can couch the problem in those terms. There is a pneuminous flicker, the whole informational schema is shifted or contemplated either within the Narp awareness or outside of it. But this is too much, we cannot couch the answer to a manifestationist issue using pneuma until we have definitively shown that manifestationism entails pneuma. This possibility seems a priori excluded from us on the basis that manifestationism is a meta-philosophy that says all philosophies are manifestations. But this raises the immediate problem hidden so far from any account of manifestationism: what are the manifestations manifestations of? This is clearly where Laruelle comes into play, for insofar as there is agreement, the manifestations are determinations in the last instance from the one. This utterly resistant one gives only its manifestations. Laruelle sometimes seems to suggest this exists at a level of preconceptual perception (very happy to be corrected). But for manifestationism that would be just one more manifestation. The essential question would be the cogency of oneness as absolutely immanent and axiomatic. If this is sound then a unified presupposition would be in some sense justified, however if something like a Deleuzian universe as different in itself, of Badiou’s axiomatic multiplicity can be conceived as equally possible then oneness itself just becomes another manifestation and the Laruelle-Narp would lapse back into (albeit very interesting) philosophy. A philosophy we might speculate (using our own terminology) shows him as an agent of oneness, as a power working against the tide of multiplicity to reestablish the dominance of oneness.

As it does not seem clear to us that oneness can be perfectly established, at the moment it looks like the non-philosophy is one more manifestation. This is not to belittle it, for its sideways parasitism upon philosophy is fascinating and we have cause to reflect on how it would approach pneuminosity.

So if oneness is not immanent then we do lapse back into pneuminosity insofar as now this itself becomes a meta-term. What manifests? Information. The informational structure is utterly immanent and the only possibility of escaping this is non-information (something postulated elsewhere). This is where the unpicking needs to take place and maybe a re-conceptualisation.

Pneuma has hitherto been discussed in two forms which broadly correlate to the agnostic disjunction magick obtains/magick does not obtain. ‘Magick obtains’ is the sense in which the term is commonly used here whilst ‘magick does not obtain’ is known sometimes as weak pneuma. This latter usage has very little difference from the normal understanding that information to the observer has no effect on the observed thing. The reason the term is used in both instances is because the language of autonomous accretions can be applied in either. The nature of how pneuma accretes is taken as given, this is clearly a gaping hole the theory and a more rigorous desciption of this process is must be supplied. Can it be denied though that information sticks together in Narp awareness? That is a different question and one which seems must be answered in the negative. Maybe just to be on the safe side we should just say information is immanent to itself. This presupposes discreta but does not rule out non-information as an underlying structure.

To return to the earlier problem, it seems then that manifestationism entails information (it does not entail non-information, non-information is a contingency within manifestationism) but it neither entails weak or strong pneuma, it entails only that there is information immanent to itself. It must make this axiomatic since it was achieved by a theorizer. If there was never any theorizer then there would be no manifestationism. For any experience in which the agnostic disjunction manifests there is a pull out of the accretive agency’s previously worked for. The agnostic disjunction makes Narp flickers on a pivot in information (where information is the pre-pneuma), it is the accretions that the Narp is an agent for that decide what choices attempt to be made. Of course an agent for contradictory accretions can only lead to one thing:

[P]Neurosis.

It seems clear to the CEO that there is some linkage between the work of Francois Laruelle and the more recent notion of manifestationism. Manifestationism however is happy to be called a meta-philosophy with as yet partially inchoate reciprocal links with philosophy (pneuminosity). Certainly one empirical argument for manifestationism is the sheer blatant failure of philosophy to significantly shift ground; rather it develops new dialectical variations but then maintains the old ones as well. So the territory is exactly that of different manifestations jostling for power. Laruelle does not speak in this way but his non-philosophy does have a certain chime insofar as the determination in the last instance of each philosophy have no more privilege over the last -they are all affectations.

The natural question is whether manifestation is guilty of the Laruellian decision (the structure of factum determining datum (though the factum could not have been derived without the datum)). Clearly there is much more thought to go into this but an initial analysis suggests manifestationism is not decisionally guilty. We remember with interest that Laruelle suggests that any philosophy will contain a meta-philosophy. But here manifestationism is only a meta-philosophy, one that was derived from pneuminosity as self-reflectively aware of itself as a-side of the agnostic disjunction (a)magick-obtains/(b)does not obtain. Pneuminosity’s having to be aware that it is only a transcendental possibility forces the opening of manifestationism i.e. the proliferations of agnostic disjunctions between all the philosophies rendering them essentially, just as Laruelle says, as affectations (with agents aligning themselves owing to their affective predelictions).

Pneuminosity does have something like a decisional structure, but its condition of recognition (which turns out to be manifestationism) does not. So far in manifestationism we have made no term for what the manifestations are of. This seems in one sense frustrating but in another more methodolically valid that actually nominating it the one-in-one (which immediately starts accreting). Of course even this absence then becomes accretively reminiscent of the forbidding of saying the name of God. This however is not the point here. The point is to say that in saying there are only the manifestations, we do not reach a place where we can say what they are manifestations emitting from (admittedly Laruelle does not either, yet he still feels the need to name it). There are just manifestations, each one with its own criteria to try to take over the territory through its agents. Maybe a terminology from whence they emit will be needed at some point but for now precisely avoiding the designation of the one (which it does seem allies Laruelle himself to a manifestation) seems a better route.

The thorns of this thicket are well known to philosophers (and non-philosophers). The umbra is said to be the phantasy of the remainder. That is, when beings which are aware of their apparent externality (like Narps) are removed what remains is the umbra. As such of course whilst being a pneuminous accretion it is a paradoxical one that tends towards articulating the impossibility of pneuma. As we have mentioned elsewhere, the umbra is not the in itself, since any in itself must take into account the relation between any aware beings and the putative externality.

This immediately raises the problem as to whether or not pneuma is just a phenomenon for Narps, a path well trodden in OOO. In OOO the implication seems to be that obviously pneuminous relations hold between accretions external to Narps, which in turn seems to assume reality is, with various temporal and spatial relativities accepted, the same kind of container that Narps exist in. It seems reasonable, this is the ‘speculative’ part in ‘speculative realism’.

Pneuma is information, of course there must be informational exchanges between the different kinds of regions surely? But of course it isn’t this simple. Firstly there is a heuristic difference between pneuma and pneuminous accretions. Pebble pneuminous relations do not accrete (at least if we allow ourselves the same speculation as OOO) other than in the damage to the pebble, there is no pebble image of the other pebble that smashed into it, there is no word ‘pebble’ for the pneuma to accrete around. There is information (pneuma) but no accretion. Secondly the condition for the possibility of informational exchange in a meaningful way is discretion. There must be things and they must be in a sense external to Narps continue to be discrete from one another in order for meaningful pneuminous exchanges to continue. It doesn’t seem to me that this has any necessity to it. Discretion could in a Kantian (Schopenhaurian) manner be entirely a product of the Narp-field. Why would we say such a thing?

The answer once again turns on the agnostic disjunction concerning the problem of magick. The agnostic disjunction has to decide in favour of magick not obtaining in order to gain any traction with discretion continuing outside of the Narp-field. But this disjunction cannot be resolved (not with current Narp epistemic restrictions). Magickal phenomena, specifically those which suggest pneuminous interference (perceived effectivity of spells or synchronicity)  in ‘reality’, suggest the whole thing can alter just like ‘that’. The ‘magick obtains’ side of the disjunction precisely looks like discretion (at least in the continual spatial sense ordinarily presupposed) may be exactly what is not going on. This is where we’ve drawn a small amount of inspiration from Laruelle’s  phrase non-philosophy, to coin non-information. That is, the umbra is speculatively non-informational. Whatever it is, and like Laruelle’s ‘the one’ it is also indifferent to predicating existence of it, it is potentially of an informational order that cannot be considered information in the way we understand it (as Brassier points out non-philosophy can said to be not so much its negation as more like the ‘non’ in non-Euclidean geometry). The non-informational umbra is not posited as a necessity but rather a necessity only given certain agnostic disjunctive options. In response to the possibility of magick the non-informational umbra is posited as radically and paradoxically empty. The notion is somewhat reminiscent of Meillasoux’s hyper-chaos. The umbra which in its restraint of the pneuma looks so powerful, is suddenly [apparently] altered in an incomprehensible manner. This happens at the level of the accretion -the symbol manifests in poignancy, hence the phrase used elsewhere ‘the pneuma affects the umbra’. The supposed structure of the umbra was suddenly nothing. The information that was thought to be in-it was suddenly shown to be only pneuminous. Yet the concomitant perpetuity of the solidity re-continues to suggest that the event was actually illusion and that there was no rupture and the agnostic disjunction swings back in favour of the solid outside and the umbratic (as-real) reasserts its dominance.