What is the God of coherence? It may the phantastical answer to some of the issues involved here. Previous posts on manifestationism have drawn attention to the problem of the manifestation of coherence. The issue being that the set of competing ontologies appears to contain the ontology in which concepts are coherent vehicles to contain being. Ambiguities can be ironed out and truth objectively unfolded. This manifestation denies the basic incoherence of concepts upon which the whole meta-theory (manifestationism) is founded.

All this manifestation needs to stay as a part of the extensive set is ironically its incoherent manifestation -incoherent coherence. As it does have this level of sense it remains present. Coherent coherence* is a nonsense. It seems quite obvious this is the case, yet as a phantasy it persists. We can find various ways to show the permeability, the ambiguity of concepts (Derrida, Wittgenstein) yet still the strange possibility that it might all make rigorous proper sense manages to hang on. This phantasy is curiously similar to christian monotheistic notions of God. This similarity is shown in positive theological qualities of God like, perfection, all knowingness etc. From the monotheistic God’s perspective ‘coherence’ is perfectly valid. When we engage in the phantasy of perfect knowledge, the manifestation of coherence, we belong to the lineage of this God. This is not to say one entails the other, though the perfect God ontology does entail the Godlike possibility of perfect knowledge (coherent coherence) but not its human access. Neither does potential human coherent coherence entail the perfect God. No, the connecting point is that they both suppose the possibility of coherent coherence.

*In the TPP a phenomenological epistemology is offered in the following form. The basic relation to a given word-object is an incoherent coherence meaning we accept the word means the object but think no deeper about this. Any thought upon the matter reveals the relation to be an coherent incoherence, i.e. we understand that the fastening of the concept to the phenomena seems in a hard sense essentially impossible. This leaves two remaining relations: incoherent incoherence -which would be outright nonsense- and coherent coherence -the perfect knowledge relation.


All systems need a patch. It’s inescapable. The previously exposed flaw in manifestationism can only be displaced by meta-meta level (since manifestationism itself is a kind of meta-philosophy). The problem with manifestationism is that it must presuppose the incoherence of concepts in order to stay afloat. It is the incoherence of concepts that means they will always have aporias which enemy agents may successfully twist to their own advantage. The incoherence of concepts guarantees the perpetual argument of philosophy especially, but to some extent all disciplines/knowledge claims. Manifestationism contains the extensive set of ontologies -extensive because it excludes many utterly arbitrary choices that have no mythological or otherwise grounding to them. However one reasonable theory of how things might be entails that the concepts are not incoherent hence manifestationism contains within itself an ontology that denies the ground on which the meta-theory itself is formed. This is clearly untenable.

To solve (patch) this situation, we propose an agnostic disjunction that occurs before manifestationism occurs. This AD would be the choice between the coherence or the incoherence of concepts. It is admittedly a somewhat bizarre one as it does put forward the possibility that concepts could be coherent which is a notion that does not even seem to clear in itself. Nevertheless it can seem to us that the possibility exists that clear definitions could be made for all notions and hence the manifestation is allowed to pass. If it could be shown a priori that this was not a possibility then manifestationism could get of the ground on this merit alone. For the moment though this possibility seems unavailable, furthermore it seems better to include the possibility of coherence as a manifestation than to attempt to prove it can be exclude. Doing this avoids the problem of attempting to exclude a system on conceptual grounds of argumentation whilst simultaneously proposing that conceptual argumentation can never close down any extensive possibility.

In a sense this still keeps the manifestationist picture intact as there is still nothing but competing ontologies. What it does do that’s different is create a two tier system in which the first agnostic disjunction must be answered. A complicating question regards the possibility of incoherence and coherence is that of magick. The desired end would be that magick would not be compatible with the notion of coherence. This however is not the case. The magickal possibility is perfectly compatible with the phantasy of coherence it’s just that this is not the chaos magickal model. The version of magick that is compatible with coherence is the older version of fixed correspondences as set into existence by some higher power. This hidden but real order of existence is part of the coherence that might uncovered. This more hardline version of magick can also be found within incoherent manifestationism but in coherent coherence it is the only form possible. There is then admittedly a bizarre coherent phantasy embedded in manifestationism.

In other places we have stated that in order to describe pneuminosity as a philosophy we must assume the reality of (chaos) magick. The situation is now that we must first of all assume the incoherent arm of the primordial agnostic disjunction and then the reality of chaos magick.

These really are notes. I’m totally aware that most of the interest herein is for the paranormal related writings, I would point out however that unless one accepts a magickal ontology blindly, then something like manifestationism follows as a wider picture. It does sound like more regular (meta)philosophy but that’s because that’s what it is. The whole point of this project is that magick taken seriously has wide epistemological implications.

  1. Manifestationism is empirically driven insofar as it pays attention to the fact that no given ontology has been able to totalise the territory. Of course there are many relatively stable knowledge claims. The chief empirical realm for manifestationism is philosophy -which is notorious for failing to establish anything. The manifestationist claim would probably be that other kinds of epistemic claims are not immune to the problem of philosophy, they are just less prone to them.
  2. Manifestationism must in this sense presuppose an ontology of concepts with permeable borders. It is in this sense self defeating. It begs the question insofar as it presupposes that knowledge is of a certain nature in order to show the consequence of this. This is a legitimate criticism, however manifestationism can still go through under this presupposition as it represents an ironically extremely stable notion. This notion is that of incoherence. A notion that natural language concepts are well defined would deny a strong version of manifestationism. This too is of course a manifestation. We might want to say that no one would believe such a thing, that no one could be an agent for such an idea, yet we know this is possible. This creates a further irony: Manifestationism is founded on the idea that theories cannot agree and cannot remove each other (to a greater and lesser degree) because concepts are incoherent in their nature. The problem with it is that is possible to have a manifestation that denies manifestationism. Such a manifestation denies the ground on which it is founded. Such a manifestation is necessarily only a competitor for the nature of concepts. Yet by its existence it shows manifestationism failure of self grounding, subjecting it to its own problem. The irony is in the fact that it is a manifestation of stability that destabilizes the picture.
  3. Manifestationism proposes that the answer to any form of enquiry is a competing ontology (manifestation) amongst others. Sometimes this dominance is quite extreme.

Horizons on which phenomena are interpreted:

  • Scientific horizon:  Certainty in one register is altered in others e.g. element behaviour in different atmospheric conditions (water boils at different temperatures at different pressures. This is generally the most stable epistemic arena.
  • Linguistic horizon: When one uses a word, we don’t know what kinds of vector might fulfil the use meaning in the future.
  • Metaphysical horizon: No propositions of any grammatical certainty exist in this realm. All such phenomena are agnostic disjunctive. Keeping ADs open requires that the phenomena not be closed down easily by rational competing ontologies. Powerful paranormal experiences need very convincing rational reductive explanations to remove them (the classic contention here being that at least for synchronicity this is not possible). Is ‘metaphysical’ sufficient for a catch all phenomena in this bracket? Are there grounds to differentiate theological issues from paranormal ones. Theological issues in some sense arise from pure faith, however they often presuppose historical paranormal phenomena that act as grounding events for the faith. There is a kind of difference that maybe warrants a subdivision system: Metaphysical: I) Theological II) Paranormal. Even though in practice the difference is minimal. Extreme putative reality altering can result in extreme manifestations taking over. Psychotropic substances can provide criteria for accepting various metaphysical ontologies.
  • Social horizon: What happened in day to day events? Who took the cheese? There is a temporal horizon for such phenomena insofar as whatever has happened recedes. We consider these problems as operating under regular reality criteria -circumstances must be extreme for us to start to consider a ghost took the cheese.
  • Awareness horizon: What is the status of being that is not within our awareness? Is being in the dark different to being in the light? Two different but related problems that show the connectedness of darkness and the umbratic. That is, light can still be out of our awareness.
  • Trust horizon: Naarps trust the accounts each other give of phenomena. This occurs in all spheres. Direct perception is a special case that pertains to the general issue of magick insofar as they believe they should not readily doubt their own experience. The problem is that their own experience is already governed by various occupying manifestations. What do they mean when they say they trust themselves?

In the site we call the Naarp, how is it determined which manifestations successfully occupy the territory? Is it possible to say anything about this without ascribing an ontology to the self?

Some basic manifestations of the self are:

  • the  soul which contingently occupies the body
  • the soul which necessarily occupies the body
  • the self which is formed by empirical relation to the body and experience (broadly nuture)
  • the self which is determined largely by the body (broadly nature)
  • the self which is in roughly equal parts bodily determined and experientially so
  • the epiphenomenal self which is not real as such but just an appearance of a controlling self
  • no self, multiplicity of powers occupying a region
  • cogent self as a power competing amongst others in a region

Manifestationism cannot solve the problem of the self or any problem of positive epistemology. This is not its purpose.

The temptation is to forge a quasi manifestationist philosophy that allows a number of presuppositions e.g. the incoherence thesis and the accretive thesis. These accepted the pneuminous accretive theory is a cogent manifestation of all phenomena. It does then though become dicatorial in paranormal acceptance. This seems wrong and dogmatic which returns the manifestationist agenda by the agnostic disjunctive door. That is any acceptance of paranormality must also face the possibility of its not obtaining (alternative explanations).


This is just a series of notes trying to put down some reflections on the matter in an attempt to try to make the theory more functional in its explanatory value.

1) Manifestationism attempts to describe a situation of quasi epistemological relativism in which ontologies compete for territory against each other.

2) We are the space in which this occurs. This invokes the issue that the ‘we’ itself must equally be recognised as equally a site for ontological competition e.g. are we ensouled, NAARPs, purely material etc.?

3) A recent proposal was made that a basic tripartite structure of:

i) Social descriptions

ii) Scientific descriptions

iii) Metaphysical descriptions

might give a basic doorway into how the manifestations function. It does broaden the notion of a manifestation but this is not a problem as the theory most certainly is supposed to be epistemologically relevant at any level.

4) “Was it you that gave her the book?” someone asks. I reply that it wasn’t me but they doubt this is the case, they believe that it was me that gave her the book and that it was not Jessica (who to my mind did give her the book). This other subject has reasons for believing the account of the event that they hold to. These are not full blown ontologies as we would think of them, just regional contingent issues. Nevertheless they are interesting insofar as they show regular reality level epistemic problems. If Steve has gone home and won’t admit to having given her the book and the other subject thinks I did it, they might very well not know it with much certainty but it might be the theory they are invested in. In the manifestationist sense, this subject-region (NAARP) is occupied by certain conceptual powers that determine this theory. These might be something like ‘a distrust of myself’ ‘a belief that I have done something similar before’ etc. They are part of a regional theory of me, an ontology of what I am in this social sense (an entity not to be trusted). This regional ontology is still a mini manifestation that competes in the territory with others. As a side note this does seem to hint at the potential at least ethical correctness of Korzybski insofar as the static sense of being (an ontology) is guiding a general impression rather than being only a singular instance (I am untrustworthy as opposed to I may have exhibited untrustworthy behaviour).

5) If I go on a diet, a particular diet that I’ve read about for a certain health benefit various things are going on here that may serve to illustrate the matter. I believe the diet is correct and I read about the nutritional science behind it. There are conflicting accounts in the science. But my friend has told me this diet is great and I trust them so I may generally try to not allow the competing account much traction, believing instead the possibly dubious references about the efficacy of the diet. The diet is also part of a quasi new age belief that hold that certain ‘negative energies’ will be removed from me by my assiduous following of it. My alliance with my friend has allowed me to take the diet idea in, maybe I’ve complained about something and they’ve suggested it. They’ve then given  me evidence of an anecdotal nature that’s taken  hold. I’ve tried to rationally reinforce it but encounter an agnostic disjunction insofar as I cannot capably disentangle the conflicting science accounts. I might be open to the notion of energetic cleansing but the discourse is entirely metaphysical. My friend insists upon the reality of it. I might seriously doubt this. But then following the diet feel a curious emotional levity. Do I ascribe this to maybe an increase in omega 3s or to a metaphysical alleviation of ‘negative energy’? The synchronicity like problem emerges. I might want to reduce the sensation rationally but I cannot be sure that the metaphysically described energy release has not taken place -as I have no criteria to test this by. But I may be convinced of this by the strange levity which I believe cannot be purely nutritionally based. This may also be true from another perspective insofar that the very idea of the energy cleansing may have had some kind of placebo like neural-hormonal feedback (this is clearly related to a weak-pneuminous theory/hyperstitional interpretation).

6) The diet and its interaction with me is a complex dynamic interplay of competing manifestations which in this case cross the full range. A social anecdotal power in relation to whatever issue I may have (which in itself may be a health related issue given to me from the modern variety of health paranoias). I seek to reinforce this power with acceptable knowledge (science) but am  potentially hampered by my alliance to my friend and the appearance equivalence in evidence (competing ontologies). The metaphysical claims of the system are partially validated and thus interpreted positively, I am unable to disprove them even with competing accounts. Because they already exist as ontological possibility (phantasy) they are not removed from the system by simply demonstrating an alternative even when the alternative is more rational (where rational means those manifestations we are able to test).

7) Does this point to an inadequacy of language. To the inadequacy of ontology? It does suggest ontology has a home. To predicate one thing of another as a cogent relation may not always be the best way of expressing it -cf the Korzybski point above. But ontology returns even if we want a process ontology.

8) The suggestion is that any given phenomena may be analysed by means of the competing ontologies that make it up. Ergo a total description does not rely upon an ontology to ground it because a total description must take into account that the ontologies in their plurality cannot be overcome. The emergence of individual points insofar as there is more than one (contra the solipsistic manifestation) dialectically creates sceptical situations on multiple levels that necessarily prohibit the dominance of any central ontology even though one (science generated) ontology may actually be correct. The question is then how far a given ontology could dominate the territory and create minimal dissonance within the system. The multiple feedbacks seem to make this difficult. A purely present at hand ontology that was true and satisfactory might still generate phenomenological contradictions that create disbelief in the ontology. This potentially ironically could only be resolved if the reality was something like the strong pneuminous model. That is, if it were true that reality were solid and fixed the synchronicity problem would most likely still remain. I cannot envisage how it could be extirpated but we could accept the possibility. However if it were true that the pneuma fedback ontologically into the umbra then this (as a scientific ontology) would be a more readily acceptable. Why? Because with evidence of a genuine relation of conceptuality and physical experience at a level of physics we could better process that this was a continuous experience of conceptual feedback as opposed to the notion that conceptual feedback is an anomaly (synchronicity/informational interference).


Reiteration is a common theme in philosophy. To this end I feel compelled to reiterate one of the central theses involved here. This is the notion of the concept being able to alter the thing it conceptualises. This has been referred to sometimes as the ‘pneuma affecting the umbra’ though more recent theoretical developments complicate this picture (the vector field).

The result has been a more a three layered idea. In this notion there is the concept (the pneuminous accretion) that is applied to the vector field. The vector field is the closest to blank pneuma that we can get, it is still perceived/felt/smelled/heard/experienced, only no conceptual determination of great clarity results from this. Only when a field of information is applied does the vector field disclosed into multiple accretions -think of a field of grasses and how as one learns to become an expert on different grasses the field slowly begins to look very different as it shows itself as a fascinating multiplicity rather than an incoherent blur. There is always some low level of conceptualisation (pneuminous accretion) going on in the vector field, even if it is just a struggling attempt (it looks like a kind of sand?) because in order to be at all, some level of hermeneutic is always present.

The umbra is what is beyond even the vector field. The umbra is the idea of the unperceived. In a sense it depends precisely on the magickal notion for its cogence. To reiterate again, this magickal cogence depends on the idea that the concept is capable of somehow altering the vector towards its nature. Ideal essences are extracted by NAARPs and then projected back onto vectors. The umbratic as a reality to some extent depends on the notion that the NAARP created accretions are affective -for if they were not then the umbratic with or without pneuma attached to it would be identical. The umbratic is the phantasy of the unperceived -the primary qualities. To reiterate (again) the suggestion is that the conceptual powers applied by the NAARPs can enact a small amount of strange alteration upon that which is grasped by them and that this hidden mode of being has an unspeakable nature that manifests to us only as the restraints we perceive e.g. solidity, continuity etc.

The vector field is essentially pneuminous but the idea that it exists outside of accretive perception is the umbratic. The umbratic is an incoherent necessary idea that plagues us. Logical rational thought seems to defeat it, yet it always desires to return. I believe I know that others perceive things yet even conceiving of the notion of the area behind my back invokes the feeling of the umbratic even if I know someone else can see this space.

Conceptuality then is taken to be an action applied to a region of the vector field and an action that does something and not nothing. NAARPs refine concepts. The application of the concept to a vector is the gateway to the inner vector but only under the auspice of the accretion involved. This is the notion of the interface and the meaning of animism. If I would talk to a stone I must select it. Once I have selected the stone I must, even if I do not name it, acknowledge it as ‘this stone’. In this way the accretion is formed. This stone looks like this, I found it here. If I want to talk to the stones I must decide they can listen. If they can listen I must imbue them with this ability. This forms the accretion around the stone-vector of this ability. The name, the acknowledgement I give the stone forms the accretion that renders possible that the stone can communicate. In this theory the stone was not alive in any sense until we activated it with the accretive capacity. The stone vector does not usually take the accretions ‘alive’ ‘conscious’ but now we have applied them to it and through this application it may respond. The formed accretion makes the stone alive. The accretion is the interface to the vector which is imbued with the concept -which allows it access to the umbratic. Things actually are things but not in the naïve way in which we so often think them to be, and neither are they not them either.

It all sounds so simple. The idea comes that a kind of dialectical end of chaos magick is in fact the accretion of God. Or rather that there might be an ethical suggestion that develops in the NAARP that rather than accreting endless separate entities for our various ends we should use the power of accretion to forge an entity that will feed back beneficence to us all. In a Pascal’s wager type sense, if agnostic disjunction entails the impossibility of discerning whether or not pneuminous (chaos magickal) type interactions are occurring or not then why wouldn’t one work with the possibility that they do -there is only gain on this side of the coin.

So if we know that (under the pneuminous/chaos magick auspice) the action of treating a stone as alive makes the stone develop a kind of consciousness (by accreting the pneuma of ‘consciousness’ to it) the surely it follows that perceiving everything as a totality as if it were conscious, would do the same thing. The means every NAARP has the power to make God actual. It sounds incredible and invites the most beautiful Hegelian style moment: that the dialectic of chaos magick ends in the creation of a perfect God, paradoxically entirely contingent upon the NAARP world and yet vested with far more power than all of NAARPhood.

It sounds almost like the perfect antidote to the Landian analysis. A hyperstitional deity to rival the AI entity from the future, forged of a bizarre intentional faith. The role of the NAARPP then can even become self justified, not as the chosen people of the deity (though one could look at it that way) in some old style religious way, but as the channel that facilitated the becoming self-aware of everything. The perfect Hegelian eschaton.

But of course things are never this simple. Even if one could begin to convince enough NAARPs of the truth their spirit creating abilities (or minimally gamble on the possibility) and even if one could then convince them that they should eschew the individual potential benefits of this possibility to devote their accretive energies towards forming a single entity, a familiar shape of problem would still emerge: not all NAARPs would be agree on the nature of the to be accreted deity. The notion as initially presented above is clearly of a kind of pantheism or panentheism but it does specifically entail self-awareness (this is its big plus over a cold ). The new God knows we’re here and listens (for it is one massive intentionally constructed accretion), it responds and wants to help.

Doesn’t it?

Even if we agreed on this, we have no real idea what ‘want’s to help’ might entail as there is no consensus as to what the ‘best’ is. Furthermore the logic of how spirits go about trying to fulfil wishes does not always go well for the NAARPs (the Monkey’s Paw e.g.). There is potential for a spritual entity trying to do its best to respond to prayers just be whatever means are available to its umbratic warpings. To remedy this the NAARPs  might need to try to ensure that the God accretion should be locked down by logical stipulations. Possibly that one should have to read and understand a document detailing its nature before joining others in accreting the deity. This invites of course the possibility of alternative rulebooks about how the Deity should behave. Multiple contingent pantheistic/panentheistic God formations means different agents operating for each manual. Contingently formed scripture. Dissatisfaction with the pan/en models might produce a more transcendent God-model complete with accretive instructions. The dream of a single God-as-all lies in a tatter of fragmented deities, all recognised as utterly contingent egregores yet each one vying to be the true manifestation and fulfil the last hope of NAARP destiny by manipulating its respective NAARP agents.

  1. If the moment of NAARP significance has passed in its strong metaphysical form, we are in the moment (for some) of insignificance. This moment can be superceded (by NAARPs) only by epistemic certainty of the deity (which might entail strong supernaturalism) or (in a weaker form) by magickal entanglement with existence that operates in relation to what we call our will.
  2. A take on Johns’ ontological Neurosis could ally it with a paradoxical manifestation of a free will that suggests an underlying determinism. That is, consciousness as released deeper and deeper into epistemological questioning (scepticism) is aptly named as Neurotic. This Neurosis appears as a motion that is simultaneously controlled and uncontrolled. Each proposition meets its doubting double, yet the enquiry in general is felt to be determined by the specific NAARP’s ‘interest’.
  3. This creates an interesting motion. The deity as metaphysical certainty still enables scepticism about the nature of the ‘what’ of the world as the deity does not give these answers in scripture (unless one makes a Spinozistic identification). Whereas putative certainty of the materiality enables scepticism about the nature of the spiritual. Both start points are incoherent, the nature of the deity was endlessly debated and no firm conclusion reached (Kant spotted this problem), yet the nature of physical being is equally theoretically contested, just with much more complicated reasoning. Yet both start points present a front of coherence. This fulfils an old CEO descriptive structure known as incoherent coherence. The successful description of materiality shows itself as a kind of resolved matter of solidity just as the deity showed itself as a certainty that could not be properly defined. Below this surface lies incoherence.
  4. Neurosis entails awareness of the problem and this is the issue here -epistemology out of control but known to be so. Descartes can see this is the case. Only a God can save his project.
  5. If the spiritual Neurosis is incoherent-coherently maintained then material Neurosis is released. If the material Neurosis is incoherent-coherently maintained then the spiritual Neurosis is released.
  6. Scepticism as neurosis guarantees that everything is questioned (it is the motion of doubt). Consciousness released into this mode cannot but apply this to everything -how do we know anything? The Wittgensteinian/Heideggerian showing that ‘knowing’ has a proper home was the only salve to this problem. In truth it is only a partial fix. This keeps scepticism at bay insofar as there are no reasonable grounds (criteria) to raise doubts. Chaos magickal possibilities (agnostic disjunction) infer any manifestation that can supply even marginally feasible criteria can get agents to work for it.
  7. Chaos magick is a manifestation of this spiritual Neurosis of pneurosis as we might call it.
  8. Metaphysical-insignificance demands either no supernaturalism or supernatural realism and in its strongest form is incompatible with weak insignificance.
  9. If AI operates without agnostic disjunction then it’s epistemology will be locked down. to insignificance.
  10. Insignificance is only relevant to guilt bearing NAARPs in the shadow of either live or dead organised religion.
  11. Guilt and Neurosis are clearly related. Though when the spiritual ontology is settled guilt is more clearly defined. When material ontology is settled, guilt is less clearly defined (a part of pneurosis).
  12. Metaphysical-insignificance is better compatible with the fruition of the human cognitive abilities into AI as our successor insofar as the AI may be stripped of the accretive baggage of humanity (but not accretions as such). This issue though turns on a further disjunction: whether or not a sufficiently developed system automatically generates (chaos) magickal abilities through conceptual accretion or whether it loses them by some actual difference between the fleshy forms and the machine (one generates a magickal capacity the other does not). If the latter is true, this represents the clearest statement of Heidegger’s ‘danger’, for in this instance spiritual potential is actually destroyed by machinic certainty -and thus arguably ultimately inferior to the reality warping beings that made it. If the former then the superior machinic comprehension would enable it to be able to reality-alter in a much more controlled manner than its fleshy predecessors, and possibly fathom the ontological actuality of what is occurring.
  13. Guilt is a major force in restricting human magickal operations since its background pneuminous structures can easily disable desired outcomes. An entity without guilt (like a possible AI), if magickally enabled would be unrestricted in this manner.
  14. A guilt free entity is aptly labelled ‘psychotic’.
  15. The moment of pneurosis is transcended by the AI psychotic. This may be precursored by a proliferation of psychotic NAARPs or rather PAARPs (Psychotic Accretion-Assimilation Regional Processor. PAARP though is a contentious term as the self is in a sense constituted by the Neurotic moment. Psychosis is pure control by accretions.






What do we mean by the claim of insignificance? Basically that in an unfeeling potentially infinite universe we have no position of meaning to anything other than ourselves. A lot of discourse in certain philosophical/cultural spheres turns on the obvious truth of this premise. I don’t want to say that this isn’t true, but I do want to point out that the notion isn’t quite as simple as it seems.

This notion of significance is metaphysical. Historically we could hold onto cosmic significance because God was actively looking out for us, or at least observing us. God cares about what we do and is all powerful. This means that despite the size of the existence, if the very thing that created it all has actual attention/rules for us then we must be in some sense important in the grand scheme.  It’s not hard to see where this heads. The Nietzschean death of God in one fell swoop shatters this significance leaving us to work out a self justifying scheme to prop up our psychic relation to existence. Of course the aforementioned DoG hasn’t happened to a lot of the population but where it has (largely the western world) it’s not hard to hear the cold harsh materialist message taken as gospel. A vast empty cosmos awaits out there. We have discovered we mean nothing, we are insignificant. A rare phenomena in the scheme of things, but without a creator the rarity is just statistical.

This all seems very reasonable. Science is very powerful at supplying good explanations that can be repeated and making good theories that sometimes have to wait a while to be tested (but that still offer decent accounts). It’s ability to do so creates an atmosphere of trust that it can uncover anything. As such the insignificance thesis proceeds as a backdrop to the general program and in some cases is worn as a kind of badge of honour. What we must not miss though in this story is that NAARPs that ascribe to the cosmic insignificance thesis are agents for that ontology. They literally work for ‘insignificance’ (an amazing display of Hegelianism alive in the system today). This is not unreasonable. It seems (from a current rational point of view) a likely scenario. It is however a choice and not the necessary truth. It looks like a good bet compared to the accretive monsters of the mass religions but in a sense this is all. One of the biggest problems for a dogmatic religion is of course (apart from any doctrines that look extremely unlikely) that there are other dogmatic religions. Any religion claiming sovereign truth is always going to look suspect in the face of others doing likewise for the simple reason that you can’t tell why one should be more true than the other. The often unpalatable anti-scientific content and the failure to agree amongst themselves makes religion an unlikely choice for the rationalist.

Magickal endeavours throw a spanner in these works -kind of. An acceptance that magick ‘works’ means that the NAARP somehow manages to affect the outside without physically touching it or speaking to another device/NAARP. Magick has two faces though, one (I) being a kind of scientific magick in which symbols, vibrations, numbers really do have a cosmic significance and as such can be reliably manipulated (under certain circumstances), whilst the other (II) being the chaos magickal one in which the symbols etc. are just vehicles for the intent of the practitioner. Both of these are compatible with metaphysical-insignificance but the latter especially does complicate what we must mean by it.

Only magick (I) can comfortably cooexist (ideologically) with religion. That is (I) often makes use of powers inherent in the religion that one is not supposed to deal with (spirits). In this way (I) is a kind of supplement to a certain religions. (II) is much more problematic for religion insofar as it entails the implication that the God of the religion itself is an egregore or accretion and the whole set up is a massive chaos magickal activity that has gained so much autonomy it now cannot afford its contingent truth to get out. One could ascribe chaos magick as the rational face of magick. Indeed acceptance of Chaos magick resolves the problem of religions insofar as it grants they are all simultaneously real and wrong at the same time. Their level of reality though does mean that within the religion magickal-type effects will occur (that act as reinforcers for believers). Neither are the believers deluded; the Jesus accretion or whatever really is responding to them, it’s just that the Jesus accretion isn’t really the one and only face of spiritual truth. Chaos magick is more rational than magick (I) but to many who would subscribe to insignificance it’s not really that rational (they will likely believe it to be psychologically explainable (AD -magick does not obtain).

All magickal phenomena are subject to agnostic disjunction and the manifestations that the NAARP is working for will decide which side of the disjunction they side with (magick obtains v does not obtain). The combination of insignificant cosmos and ‘magick does not obtain’ is not problematic. Indeed as intimated on a previous post on the Lovecraftian outside these sit reasonably along side. That is, since the sounds, symbols etc. intrinsically have a certain power it is merely the putting them in the right place and time that procures the result. We don’t have to dwell on the problems of the implementation and underlying science, we only have to note the theoretical possibility and how this separates the NAARP from bringing the effect about by force of will, that is whilst there is a will, the action is brought about in a similar way in which on  desires to make a table and thus goes about the procedure for making one. It is just a case of putting the pieces in the correct order, magick is just a cold spiritual science.

The position that is problematic is the accommodation of chaos magick and insignificance. It is not necessarily problematic but it does raise some complications. Chaos magick means that the medium is purely contingent. Any medium capable of carrying the request will do. This means the symbols, vibrations have no intrinsic power, these are just vectors to be imprinted by the desired result. The request is necessarily in a informational (pneumious) form hence to repeat myself for the nth time it must be possible for the pneuma to affect the umbra (for the information to overcome the seeming restraint of the outside). This means though, unless we want to say that existence has two distinct modes (magickal and non-magickal), then the potential for this kind of affect is always with us (Crowley’s ‘Every intentional act is a magickal act’). Existence is perpetually reacting to NAARP desiring relations. The pneuminous accretive notion kicks in here to explain unintentional magick like synchronicity (informational interference) as the pneuminous accretions are quite autonomous and not necessarily at the behest of any NAARP. Of course this doesn’t entail metaphysical significance in the same way. Magick obtaining does not entail metaphysical meaning any more than it does a God. It does however offer a couple of potential escape routes.

One is that a reactive existence in a chaos magickal type way does ironically raise the possibility that the outside/whole is just listening to the request and acquiescing -Magick becomes a way to talk to a very fluid Spinozistic God. This doesn’t say this is the case, but it does suggest that one then has as good a criteria that the whole listens and responds as one does to say the chaos magickal effect is just our ability to control an area of it by force of will. I think this gives a weak form of metaphysical significance. It is not humans as the chosen race of the Deity, but it does mean the wholeness of everything is in some sense aware of NAARP activities and listens to them, hence it is not cold and uncaring per se, it tries to respond. The level of intent behind the response of course could only be speculated upon but this still guarantees a connection with the outside. Pneuminous relations are returned to their meaning as ‘spirit’.

The second entails the strange notion that if we accept we are in and part of a series of potentially magickal accretions then we can enable a version of the ontological argument. That is, the very notion of accreting forms that entail universal significance in a bizarre way would actually does so. This wouldn’t be the metaphysical significance of the one and only deity but rather a second order metaphysical significance derived from an accretive deity-proxy for existence itself. A line of Hegelian thought can be uncovered here to suggest that the accretion of this significance, though through a contingent proxy, is actually the way in which the pneuma (through NAARP structures) accretes the only kind of strong metaphysical significance possible. Having said that though, it could be argued that (for the NAARP population we’re talking about here) that dialectical moment has been and gone and the moment.

If accretion-assimilation is compatible with manifestationism then what does magick obtains v magick does not obtain signify? Not a whether or not the structure can be construed in this way as this is no longer ontological -it is meta-ontological. The ontological decisions concern the actual nature of how things work as speculative possibilities propped up by theory or praxis. No such certainty obtains for any of them though restraint suggests strong criteria for some. The ontologies need agents. All pneuminous structures need agents. As established there is no way of committing with certainty to the control that the NAARP has in all of this. Is it more than an accretion-assimilation or identical to one or less? Answers are forthcoming but they are inevitably from agents of ontologies? The same problem: are they agents of ontologies or do the ontologies serve the NAARP? Who is working for who? It can be literally both. As an employee I might be actually working as an agent for tables, chairs other furniture. I haven’t invented them. As an author I might be working for novels or some other medium. But as an author I am also working for the NAARP (if I seek recognition). If I am a poet and I do not seek recognition I am just working for poetry. Financial concerns seem to often entail a desire for recognition. Certainly in a capitalist environment a sense of legitimacy about being a certain kind of NAARP is aided by being financially successful at that endeavour. This does not say one should strive to be a pure agent of a discipline. There is no value judgement, only description. A highly successful agent of philosophy transcends the existing categories and accretes as a new one -Heideggerian. As my named NAARP I may be able to set the pneuma to work for me. This does not say who is actually in charge but it presents a notion of the appearance of both. I may be swept purely along or I may be the site of a new structure. Our language for being such a site, is to credit the creation to that NAARP. Again though the ultimate attribution cannot be made.

Philosophy can a be tedious business. Repetition of the same matter is often the plat de jour. These recent notes do not alter this pattern. The situation we have here is an interesting one insofar as we have two philosophies that seem to have some potential to overlap. Is it an overlapping or a synthesis (or a struggle)? The repetition is the grinding over the same territory in search of the point of clarity.

The two philosophies in question are the pneuminous accretive theory and the assimilative-neurotic theory. Both notions instantiate autonomy to concepts.  The former by means of the way in which a concept accretes information (pneuma) and (under the strong magickal version) persists in existing as outside of the entities that create and are inhabited by them. The autonomy is pointed to by the phenomenology of synchronicity which suggests rogue pneuminous interference. Assimilation is not derived from occult phenomenology but more by the observation of a endless proliferation of concepts that synthesise with ourselves and with others. The pneuminous theory’s plug in of concept to vector is achieved (in assimilation) by the notion of tautology. This is also the case in accretive theory, the vector is the concept (though it can be taken over by others).  Object (vector) and concept achieve a kind of identity (tautology).

Assimilation is less ontologically restricted insofar as accretive theory is more descriptive of an actual ontology. This though is only true if one chooses a specific aspect (strong (magick obtains) or weak (magick does not obtain)) accretive theory. Any decision one way or the other results in a partial manifestation disclosure (and ontological decision). However remaining agnostic we still note reasonably that accretion takes place. This kind of accretion though must bracket off any ontological commitment. It can only note that information sticks together and note the hugely complex historical nature of these accretions that occur in NAA(assimilation-accretion)RP field. Assimilation likewise can only note the conceptual region’s ability to be plugged into (a bar, a board game, flatpack furniture, a piece of art). Every ontological description is just a further assimilation.

What we must note here is that assimilation can slide into ontological decision when we push a certain agenda too far. The agenda suggested here is that of pneuminous determination i.e. of the concept’s ability to control the NAARP (or not). It is easy to comprehend the NAARP as being purely controlled by the accretion-assimilations (since they are rendered autonomous). The version of this theory that commonly appears in here is that the self is one specific type of  AA (the neurotic accretion-assimilation or NAA) amongst various AAs. In the normal situation the NAA has the appearance of control whereas mental health issues can variously be described as the NAA being controlled by the AAs.

But how much control does the NAA have? Johns’ work sometimes suggests very little. It is this suggestion that can tip assimilation out of its meta potential into a conceptual determinism. The underlying manifestation concerns the nature of the NAA. Every which way you choose you enter an ontological decision.

Is the NAA’s control:

  1. Illusory entirely?
  2. Partially illusory?
  3. Actual?

Every choice entails a different ontological picture. E.g. if 1 then we can say the NAA may not be essentially different from any other AA -it has no more or less control than a table AA. 2 and 3 are compatible with the picture suggested above. The potential actual control of 3 does entail this is how things are only that an NAA could be in actual control. 2 suggests this never possible. Already a fourth possibility appears: that an NAA can be in more or less control at different times.

NPC type theories like this kind of notion by trying to insinuate that most NAARPs are controlled by concepts whilst allocating a sense of control to a specific group (the ones labelling the others). Such groups of course should be aware that factions within the enemy agent group will be thinking similarly about them.