I was recently asked the following question regarding the TV theory.

1) Can an accretion float outside of its transcendental vector?

The answer can on be couched in terms of manifestationism (agnostic disjunction). That is, there is a prior level of determination at the Narp level that decides which ontology is being worked for (as an agent). If the Narp is working (largely, as there is no such thing as a pure agent) for the  ‘magick obtains’ arm of the disjunction then certainly the accretion is taken to be able to float outside its vector in a very literal manner. Though it may have been forged by the Narp, it swiftly exits this region to the autonomous pneuminous realm. In regular experience this is the process of abstracting a concept from the experience of the vector (set of restraints) that gave rise to that grammar (concept). The floating free in the magickal sense is what enables the cogency of applying concepts to vectors that would not give rise to them e.g. applying ‘fish’ to a cardboard box. The implication being that in some manner which is thought to be potentised by ritual etc, the fish accretion is then literally attached to the cardboard box (where cardboard box is a vector with cogent concept attached to it). This might generate pneuminous interference patterns around this box relating to ichthyoid phenomena, or it might not (such interactions are very hard to gauge). Nevertheless the theory says that the incoherent fish accretion would in some sense be attached to that vector (the cardboard box).

On the other arm of the agnostic disjunction (magick does not obtain), the concept is housed within the Narp and is transmitted only through commincation. The vector theory can still hold epistemologically but no vectors either appropriately or inappropriately are ever affected by the accretion. The accretion ‘fish’ as applied to the box will do nothing more that generate confirmation bias or be subject to statistical possibility of ichthyoid event. Cardboard box is a use term that works for that vector but is no more imprinted into the vector that anything (because Narp concepts do not have the ability to exert this kind of force). Abstraction is of course still possible and accretive archetypal forms still arise (a common image of a fish). They float around in Narps, but not outside of them (conceptual pneuma needs a processing unit to contain its complexity).

And…

2) Is the body (or in our language the concept of the body) a significant factor in the making actual of magick?

Magick almost disintegrates in our hands here and we are reminded how ill defined the term is. I tend to lump under this heading any phenomena that it is possible to conceive as having been the result of a pneuminous-accretive interaction at a distance from any particular Narp, as opposed to what we would call either a regular pneuminous effect (an instruction) a physical one. The synchronicities are always some of the best examples as they are clearly symbolic interactions with reality at an eventful level: the pneuma has somehow manipulated the putative physicality. Result of magickal operations have a similar structure and are basically consciously-manipulated synchronicity. Information (pneuma) has been instructed to imprint itself in what we call ‘reality’ and sometimes it (agnostic disjunction accepted) works. This can make an impression that the body-vector is not so significant. It seems we have something of a split arising that mirrors the concerns between information at a lower level than conceptual. Concepts are called accretions because they are composed of various pneuminous strands accreted together. The body as an entity with a good degree of autonomy to the conscious part can be conceived as having its own agenda. In a sense it is an excellent and direct example of the way in which pneuminous-accretions can alter their vector. Psycho-somatic effects are what is indicated here; free floating concept creatures (accretions) can positively (a Narp level value judgement) or negatively affect the running of the regional processor (body). Positive thinking is an attempt to imprint certain pneuminous accretions into the Narp-vector to alter its attitude to events, likewise calling yourself a failure is literally attaching the failure accretion to your Narp -this will likely increase the level of failure experienced. Thinking you’re feel ill makes you feel ill etc.

All conceptual comprehensions of the body are of course rendered in pneuminous-accretions. It seems if we want to attribute magickal power to the body we must in some sense separate it from the conscious part. Despite much talk about overcoming this opposition, in fact it is a highly functional heuristic that is often made more cogent by occult practice (think of OBEs). The vector that enables the concept mind does not have physicality as part of its restraints. In chaos magick the emphasis is often on utilising whatever works. To this extent, believing my body to be a kind of magickal energy generating machine (e.g. through Taoist practice) is not true of the vector region we call the body itself, it is rather an pneuminous attachment to the vector that then functions to enable magickal force (like imposing fish on box). The alternative to this (elsewhere in the blog relatedly discussed as Umbratic Magick) is that the body-vector really does have the ability to exert magickal effects. That is, it is an appropriate conceptual application to treat the vector thus. Much magick does treat it very much in this way, sexual practice is frequently used to: raise magickal force, shut down the mind for sigil activation etc.

It seems the body as a storehouse of force is a ‘significant factor’ in the ‘making actual’ of magick. This though it must be admitted can still be contingent association.  If ‘magick obtains’ it is conceivable that bodily emphasised means of realising it are just a way of enacting pneuminous-interference and not a way that can be privileged. To suggest that the body is in some sense privileged entity to be magickally drawn upon is to open up the second arm of the agnostic disjunction: magick accretions can be attached to any vectors with equal efficacy/magickal accretions are greater empowered by being attached to certain vectors (e.g. the body, though this might also hold true of certain symbols).

This is an incomplete answer, though it gets someway to opening up the field. The reemergence of the umbratic/pneuminous magick disjunction needs further exploring. Also brought up again is the need for a distinction in the way the simpler pneuminous interactions show themselves to be in contradistinction to the actions of the accretions -even if these are only heuristics.

The vectors for physical objects must conform to at least the grammar of duration and spatiality in order to carry the relevant concepts. Non-physical objects are different insofar as they are not reliant on an underlying vector of physicality. Does this mean they rely on a non-physical vector? I think there are actually different cases here, not just physical and non-physical objects. Consider a poem. The vector of a poem might be the words written down, but of course they might not be understood as words, again manifestationism creeps in: either the information is somehow pneuminously stuck to the inscribed words or they are just lines on a flat surface -if they are even that outside of perception. The vector of the poem is also the sounds. Both the words and the sounds might be interpreted as something else, maybe there is no concept of poem. The concept poem is attached to the vector. We want to say: but of course this is a poem, the poet wrote it! This situation already presupposes poetry and its poeisis. Just because the poem is written as poem does not protect from its role as a vector for another concept or as part of a vector for another concept. Again, on a strong pneuminous reading, poemness as  an accretive form is embedded in its origination yet even on this reading it may act as a vector for other pneuminous forms.

But this was not the question. The question was ‘is a poem attached to a vector?’ There is a sense that it is, even for a culturally determined region like a poem. The poem belongs to the structure that is known as poetry. The last century was fascinating in its stretching of this concept. Free verse flourished, which in turn opened the floodgates for further Derridean-style variants on what might count as poetry: the concept poetry attached itself to a wider vector. Today poets like Amy Ireland push this agenda still further, seeking to attach the poetry accretion to yet other vectors. Concepts can attach to vectors that allow the attachment. We cannot start trying to expand the concept ‘stone’ to a range of new phenomena (except as magickal practice). In the case of poetry we feel maybe it is impossible to say what could definitely not be poetry, though some advocates of style and form might feel this was quite easy. Now though the line becomes like magick. I take three stones and arrange them in a certain way and say ‘this is my poem’. If I accept this the accretion of poetry to stones (these stones and stones) becomes firmer. Though grammar does not let me say, ‘this poem is a stone’ unless I say this poetically.

This is an attempt to solve the problem I often perceive to occur in OOO in its sloppy ignorance of all the linguistic philosophical progress that was made last century. I think it’s pertinent because the language relation is crucial to understand the alternative realities that lie flickeringly present beside the dominant materialist convictions. Let me say that the notion is under construction so I expect some conceptual difficulties. Nevertheless here at the CEO we are encouraged by the potential exhibited so far.

The term vector is taken from the notion as a host which carries a parasite, the parasites here though are concepts. The vector term can be used in a fairly ordinary solid world compatible philosophy or it is equally applicable to the fluid world magickal one.

  1. Vectors are the phantasy of the myth of the given. Phantasies are agnostic disjunctive options that are not dominant but that will not go away. The notion of pre-interpretive perception is exactly such a thing. It looks cogent and not cogent at the same time. We can somehow easily conceive that we could see things without our having names of them yet when challenged we find that perceptual content is comprehensive conceptually grasped albeit incoherently.
  2. Vectors are regions (vectors do not settle Kantian or otherwise arguments) that have certain natures, certain restraints to them. These restraints enable conceptual attachment (accretion).
  3. E.g. the classic hammer. The ready-to-hand hammer before it has reached further accretive levels (noun/image like present-at-handiness) is still the primary form of attachment to a vector. If you want to say that the people had a concept ‘stone’ then we acknowledge that ‘stone’ too is attached to a vector. Vector regions enable the concept stone via accretive similarity (hardness, coldness, in the earthness), but all the concepts are formed by the Narps or other beings capable of some kind of informational cognition. The set of restraints that enables the vector to facilitate the concept stone, enables the facilitation of hammer (with some further restraints, like shape etc).
  4. There is no talk of vectors as noumenal or in themselves, they are just what allows certain conceptual attachments to make sense. They are not real objects. ‘Real objects’ has a grammar depending on your ontology that is itself facilitated by certain vectors, what kind of thing can have ‘real object’ attached to it? This sends us down a circularity that reminds us of the need for manifestationism (the competing world of ontologies) indeed vectors may be able to part of manifestationist theory as the transcendental condition of what can count as some kind of discreta in a given ontology.
  5. This is worth repeating and may indeed end up as the stumbling block. Vectors are not objects, rather object is a concept attached to a transcendental vector. OOO wants to widen this to non-physical objects, this is a reasonable aim that the vector notion aims to deal with more successfully than ‘object’. Objects in ooo are not carriers for concepts, they are often phrased as simply being something. This is inadequate for their description in relation to other things. A ‘stone’ is not lying next to a ‘hammer’ outside of our perception, unless of course we think of the strong pneuminosity theory in which the hammer accretion is actually attached to the vector, making it in some sense a hammer for anything. There is certainly a complicated picture to paint in relation to the nature of different kinds of objects, we should be wary of simple reductions.
  6. In a sense a vector is not a discreta, as discreta is the basic restraint for ‘object’. Vectors are preconceptual restraints in accessible being that allow concept attachment, either as use or just name (‘this is called Maxwell’, doesn’t tell me what its for, or how it will behave). We might in this respect speak of a vector field as potentially comprised of regions that disclose themselves owing the Narp interaction.
  7. A given ontology wants to say ‘this is an object’. To do this it must cogently be able to say what restraints apply. Object is also a concept. If the grammar of this ontology says that physical discreta are objects, then vector regions for this concept must have e.g. discretion and space taking as features.
  8. The vector can only be detected by its transcendental status. If concepts are autonomous they may attach to each other (pure pneuma) or to umbra (vector regions). Concepts are not just for Narps, animals clearly have some degree of conceptualisation and other pneuminous bundles with processing abilities may also exist. Noun-concepts are just a refined more accretive form of pneuminous relation.
  9. The restraint by the vector makes the accretion of the pneuma possible (the concept formation).
  10. Objects do not ‘withdraw’ because there is no object to withdraw. An object cogently spoke of as such is an object which relies on a vector. The vector does not withdraw, it is just the host for the object concept, it is visible as such.
  11. A concept may inhabit any vector that allows it to do so (meaning as use).
  12. In magick we may attach concepts to vectors that seem to defy the grammar of the restraints of the vector e.g. this piece of paper has the power of healing.
  13. Vectors deny any concept being applicable to them.

 

The philosophy of pneuma herein does not try to be some jargon like nonsense -though of course hardly any writers set out to achieve this. Terms like this become a kind of short hand for what the author wants to convey. Of course it’s so easy for the shorthand that is so clear to the author to become impenetrable to the readers Appropriating a term and utilising it with your own rules is a satisfying reterritorialization or re-accretion. The term used by myself is pneuma. Pneuma has come to mean a kind of informational substance that I think I have probably presupposed the cogency of without seriously exploring it. This writing makes some attempt to fill in part of the technical picture behind pneuma and its accretions. Why pneuma though? There is something arbitrary and appropriate about the choice. I came across the word pneumatology in Nietzsche as I have mentioned elsewhere (see Pneumatology and Chaos Magick). It’s meaning of breath and spirit connoted the hermetic air element, and from here the air element’s association of communication, hence pneuma came to mean the spirit of communication (information).

Information is a relation between one point which is external to another in some grammatical sense (it is cogent to say so). The point which is external is taken a) to be external and b) to be of a certain nature to the other point. The only things we can exercise relative certainty of their having informational relations are those beings which disclose themselves as having awareness. This does not deny the manifestation of the external reality of stones etc but it does mean attributing informational relations between stones and earth might not be cogent.

Information at the level of Narps becomes commonly transmitted in linguistic verbal and non verbal actions. Wittgenstein’s essential position is taken to be unassailable unless there is somehow an actual attachment between word and object. The meaning of a word is certainly primarily its use. The only way in which designation is possible is if some kind of metaphysical connection were forged between word and noema. If there is no such connection then usage controls all means of language employment.

A picture something like the following is taken to be the process of designation formation: readiness to hand of things entails only that they have a usage with no ontological examination of the what it is made of. The regular occurrence of such equipment forms stable associative names, shapes and material that come to dominate the equipment as archetypal form (a transformative process of accreting other information to the word). This is the accretion of information. On the periphery of this dominant accretive form are all the variant vectors that might still count as supportive of the accretion. This dominant image/word accretion then is rarefied into a pure informational realm (commonly called mind). It becomes idea-image associative of the what-for as relevant to it.

This accretive image is then what becomes seemingly determinative of what a thing is such that it counts as that thing, a strong version of this entails there is an ontological shoring up of the vector by the accretion so it becomes more like the accretion (seeing a thing as a thing attaches it to that thing literally in some ineffable way). Of course it is always possible for this to be reformed/re-accreted. In the region in which the informational accretion is dominant it exerts an  actual force of constraint upon the vector as thing. This is minimally a connecting force. A line of connection between being of awareness  and thing-accretion. Via the accretion of information the thing thought of is actually connected to and not just in the mind. This is achieved because the information in the aware being and that attached to the externality are the same.

Something like this set up makes actual designation possible. The informational accretion when triggered attaches to that thing literally by pneuminous thread. Unique designation entails something like magickal connectivity (sympathetic magick).

Wittgenstein understood how language (nouns esp) appears as if it has this strange ability to touch the thing it seems to refer to. This appearance is a manifestation –a way in which things show themselves. But this manifestation of designation entails actual metaphysical connectivity which does not entail magickal manipulation but certainly makes it look a lot more reasonable.

The above does not say this manifestation is the correct one, what it does say is that the appearance of something like a reality in which words actually plug into putatively external  things is a reality that shows itself all the time. Compound this appearance with all manner of low grade agnostic paranormal manifestations (telepathy, synchronicity etc) and we hope to  show why a serious metaphysical exploration of these implications is relevant. This does not conflate phenomenology with metaphysics (as Wolfendale accuses Harman of) as in this case the metaphysics in immanent to the phenomenology of what is being dealt with. The agnostic disjunction is a constant flickering between this showing and that of rationalist solidity.

 

Ideas seem to get away with murder. We are asked what ‘Happiness’ is and we all either accept some Platonic Universal  description (Quasi-Objective) or the exact opposite; what ‘we’ believe/want to see happiness as being (in this sense it is a use term meant to bring about an effect). Joe Bloggs works in a 9-5 office day job but when he finished on a Friday night he goes out clubbing. He associates this with happiness. What does this mean? There is a psuedo-objective claim on ‘clubbings’ part that advertises happiness (and other concepts such as freedom and sexual promiscuity). Maybe Clubbing is happiness? This claim is not necessarily objective but more historical and concrete; clubbing was/is an assimilation that brought about a feeling of happiness (even if we see it as a forced assimilation – as in the taking of drugs which literally give you happiness effects). The terrain of happiness expanded and changes during the 80’s (incrementally with the first assimilation of ‘dance’ in various cultures, all taking on different assimilative effects). But we have all been in a club before at 2 am feeling alienated, anxious and tired haven’t we? Why is the assimilation not working? Do I need to ‘plug in’ more? Is my neurosis of an ex-lover ruining my participation in this assimilative dancefloor?

To assimilate can be both an unconscious process; the moving of bodies, the rhythm of steps and notes, a history of semiotic mechanisms that orient a body, value, practice, culture, etc. But it can also be very conscious in the tacit sense; in order to assimilate the drinking, discourse, steps of the nightclub one has to play its game and partly know its effects. Joe Bloggs once watched a film where two woman were in the backseat of a sports car, being chauffeured by a young attractive male, letting their hair down and laughing (‘uplifting’ rock music was playing in the background). Now when Joe gets invited into a car at night he rolls the windows down, sticks his head out and laughs. He tries to assimilate what has been represented as freedom … and 3,2,1 .. it kind of works.

What are the problems with OOO? Isn’t it the funky philosophical panacea that everyone’s talking about? Well it is, a bit, and in large measure it isn’t (in my opinion). I find it strange to argue as the insights of manifestationism reveal me to be a Narp-agent for other philosophy. A priori OOO isn’t coherent but then neither is any system I might espouse. This sounds like grist to the OOO mill, incoherence=withdrawal. This though is my struggle with it because I think I’m so close to being an OOO ally and yet I’m not (I think). Whether I read Morton or Harman there is always something nagging at me about it. One issue is a linguistic one. I think there is a lot of sloppy writing in OOO that is unnecessary (not rhetorical invocation).

I don’t believe we can just forget the linguistic turn, I think it generated important approaches (most notably from Wittgenstein) that we have  to continue to take seriously. The standard poor phraseology is when the OOO theorist says ‘n experience of the cup is not the cup’. This is a such a simplified jumble of the situation it doesn’t tell us anything. There is a confused conflation of two types of withdrawal embedded in this. One is the Husserlian profiles withdrawal (I cannot see the far side of the cup) and the other is the ‘what else it may be’ withdrawal which is more Heideggerian in flavour, though Wittgenstein extends this more effectively.

The latter problem concerns a missing meta-term (that frankly is up for grabs). This is a linguistic confusion, I cannot say ‘the cup does not show me all of its being’ in the second sense because in its use disclosure it has showed itself as cup. Morton shows this kind of mess up nicely with his breeze block description in Realist Magic. Here he conflates breeze block ‘a use term’ with the x that he wants to talk about. What he believes are the fruitful rewards of OOO reasoning in fact are just a linguistic confusion perfectly exemplified here “An architect makes an exploded view of a cross section of the block. But a cross section of a cinder block is not a cinder block. A finger’s impression of a cinder block is not a cinder block. A butterfly’s touch on a cinder block is not a cinder block.” (Morton p50). In the language game of architecture if I say ‘what are we looking at here?’ and the architect replies ‘a breeze block’ the answer is cogent: it is a breeze block, this is meaning of being in this instance. If I do not know what I am touching, then no, that’s not a breeze block. But if I am perfectly aware and you say ‘what are you running your finger along?’ and I say ‘a breeze block’ then actually it is a breeze block. He says but the sensation isn’t the breeze block but he’s asking too much of language. Consider: ‘I’m feeling a sensation but not the breeze block itself.’ No the butterfly’s touch on a breeze block isn’t a breeze block because now there isn’t any breeze block because that’s a use term from a Narp perspective. Of course I know what he means but it’s badly written. OOO has withdraw to some kind of meta-term to stop talking in this muddle.

What is meant is the x that discloses itself as a cup (or breezeblock) has other possible modes of being. This is true. This whatever it is ‘x’ might be rediscovered in a cupless world and take a new name and useage. I know it seems nit-picking but isn’t this what we’re supposed to do? This is what Heidegger means in a sense and why the critique of Heidegger’s correlationism is difficult (frankly all correlationist critique is up against it still) and wrong. Dasein (Narps) names the cup, it calls it into being, it isn’t a cup without Dasein. When we examine it at a molecular/phenomenal level we must pay attention to the language game. ‘Is that cup made of plastic?’ ‘Yes’. This tells me something about the cup and its breakability. But a pure molecular analysis of it in one sense just reveals plastic, it doesn’t reveal a cup made of plastic, it just reveals plastic. Only the use and language game reveals the cup as cup. The cup is the information not the plastic, or the pottery its made of etc. Unless (and if you agree with this you’re letting the magick bit in btw) the cup lying part broken under the hedge for many years is somehow actually imprinted with some nebulous cupness (the incoherent pneuminous accretion as I would call it) then it makes no sense to call it a cup in its relation to these putative other relations that are happening to the thing. This x is not a cup to the bacteria on it, or the slugs in it, it is the cup itself that has withdrawn. This standard list of endlessly viewing the cup, smashing it up, x-raying as a kind of proof that the cup withdraws is all nonsense. The meaning of the cup is the usage cup, that somehow despite the work of the last century everyone seems to have forgotten. The thingness is being conflated with the spatio-temporal objectness.

As for profile withdrawal, it isn’t a feature of cups as such, it’s a feature of any spatio-temporal object of a grammatically dubious nature. Do I see the other side of the tree? No. What does it matter philosophically? Well it matters if you have criteria to raise an epistemological problem with the umbratic part, if not what grounds do you have to play this game. Do you believe the ontological status of the shadow part may be different to the visible front part? If you do then you are a correlationist (that’s fine, this is also one consequence of magickal thinking) if you don’t: what do mean by it’s withdrawn? You point out that you can’t see it but you’re perfectly happy that it’s exactly the same as it is when you’re not looking at it? This of course is related to the notion that objects translate one another. There is something here. There is something fascinating in pondering various unnameable objects pressing against others. This does of course presuppose the discretion of these things though. The very profile trick the OOO theorist uses to point out withdrawal does in some sense work against them. If one subscribes to recognising the shadowy parts are of an unknown ontological status compared to the visible parts then of course no one knows what’s going on in these depths. The discretion of things itself could be a way in which our perception is working and in this dark umbra maybe there is no differentiation, hence this OOO speculation is nothing but the anthropomorphisation of the objects and not the breakthrough it wants to be.

Bigger than this picture of course is where I started. OOO is manifestation (philosophy of the world). It is a picture presented to us that has a good many Narps attached to it as agents. It continues to accrete informational tentacles across the philosophical globe as it battles promethenianism and the advocates of the great twentieth century philosophical tendencies: phenomenology (I don’t consider OOO as an extension of Heidegger, it’s a misunderstanding of him) and post-structuralism. I place Wittgenstein with an unknowing foot in both these camps. I think OOO is too epistemologically unsound to be a decent theory of objects. It’s a reaction to a certain perception of extreme correlationism, which is really just good philosophical skepticism.

 

It is the most curious sensation to play with manifestationism and not a little like the feeling of non-philosophy. One must accept a kind of space, an experience in which the manifestations occur, without making any ontological interpretation. Manifestations are but it seems no reason can be given without lapsing into a manifestation.

The infuriating perpetual questions of how the manifestations arise and why is one preferred over another arise again and again. Let’s try to be as clear as we can be. Manifestations are theories of how the world is. These arise in the manifestation-space (a subject like notion that like Dasein tries to avoid the subject description). This indicates something like non-philosophy insofar as it intimates a kind of incoherent space without manifestations, a pre-ontological space. This space cannot be pronounced as definite but it is certainly worth exploring, it also raises the possibility of the primacy of pneuma over manifestations. There are also Kantian echoes here as it seems to suggest temporality might be something outside of manifestationism (a pure intuition?) -but not outside of pneuma.

Furthermore it seems something like a Laruellian ‘real’ is suggested as the ground for the manifestation space. This is cogent with the work herein insofar as it is reminiscent of the ‘umbra’ which offers restraint upon the manifestations possible criteria (the reasons they might arise e.g. the hard is not the soft).

The question perpetually arises as to whether or not manifestationism in some way establishes itself as a force that somehow transcends its role as meta-philosophy and paradoxically backs one of the manifestations.

This seeming ridiculous hubris of a notion is what must be strived for to forge -as all philosophers strive for- the most perfect all encompassing machine possible.

Manifestationism is, we will recall the notion that every philosophy/theory is a competing manifestation of how things might be. Manifestation has a sceptical aspect to it insofar as it denies we can know for certainty any of the manifestations are definitively correct -even if one of them was. Of course some of the competing manfestations are themselves theories that speak of certain knowledge whereas others are more sceptical. This seems to show that there is some bias in manifestationism i.e. in espousing a pluralism that cannot settle on a definite system the sceptical element is in-built.

However manifestationism does not deny that one of the manifestations might be correct, it is simply that we in our limited Kantian way cannot tell which one it is. Saying that kind of thing makes out that this is just a Kantian philosophy. Well in one sense this is hard to deny and in another it’s very easy: transcendental idealism is a manifestation and hence not ascertainable as the definitive answer. So it’s reminiscent of Kant but it’s not Kant. Manifestationism is saying that each manifestation-field  (Narp, subject, take your pick) is not sufficiently equipped to be able know with certainty which manifestation is correct. It seems reasonable that all manifestation-fields should adhere to those manifestations which are most functional, however this is clearly not the case as many manifestation-fields are occupied by manifestations taken to be deeply untrue by other manifestations i.e. flat-earthers, UFO enthusiasts etc exist, and utilise their sceptical right to deny manifestations that consider them as nonsense. We like to rationalise these perspectives away with confirmation bias etc. but this only shows that we have already bought into a series of manifestations that accept confirmation bias as an explanatory notion in this respect.

So manifestationism is saying that there is an epistemological barrier with regards to understanding which manifestationism is most true. Experience at the level of the individual manifestation-field might determine unshakeable faith to a manifestation rejected by the larger field-sets.

Manifestationism also must take the same meta-scepticism about the ontology of the being that is where the manifestation processing takes place itself, hence the term manifestation-field as a notion trying to distance itself from any particular ontological bias -which is even present in Narp.

The interesting issue arises when we consider the manifestation of pure information. This ontology (pneuminosity)  says everything is information -that is, insofar as there are discreta they have relations between them which may be constituted as information. Every manifestation is a priori information. The question the other manifestations must answer to free themselves is ‘how are they not information?’. This denial seems impossible. Is then a manifestationist philosophy also a philosophy of pure information? Information in a sense seems to be an a priori that transcends the manifestationist’s scepticism. Even the speculation that all is really a non-informational continuum is contradicted by the possibility of the speculation itself. The meaning of such an ontology is one in which the continuum is pure energetic motion in which there are no discreta as such so the informational relation as description loses its force. Information as ontology gains its force from beings which conceptualise.

This means that the following manifestations are laid bare:

I) The manifestationist field encompasses a realm that is unaffected by the manifestation-field.  That is, whether there is or is not a manifestation field, this realm remains identical.

or

II) The manifestationist field actually affects the putative externality that the manifestations arise to comprehend -the content of the manifestation-field. In this case the information generated in the manifestation-field means that the realm with no manifestation field and the realm with one are not identical.

Something like these manifestations constitutes the primary philosophical disclosure, the primary agnostic disjunction. Alongside monism and pluralism, probably this is the fundamental basis of trying to create any ontology. But we digress.

It is not possible to escape manifestationism without privileging one manifestation, which you would have to know to be certain in order to deny the living pluralism. No ontology is compatible with manifestationism except a pure informational ontology where this pure informational level is not an idealism but rather only idealism/realism/monism/pluralism as information, it is something prior to any of these. As soon as the information is decided as an ontology it lapses into a manifestation.

There’s something fascinating here that needs more work. This will have to wait for another day.

 

 

 

Manifestationism is shown by agnostic disjunction. The clear case of which is the pneuminous interference case (the inability to know the nature of the paranormal event). This immediately can be seen to have implications for our interpretation of all manner of phenomena. Agnostic disjunction is an immanent process that discloses manifestationism as the nature of our background pneuminous hermeneutic. We live in a flicker of solidity and fluidity. What is presented to us as what is the case is only the case on the back of prior understanding. What is reported as true by particular Narps or large accretive entities (media) has easy criteria for its doubt/acceptance -people/organizations lie for their own ends. These criteria are variously accepted or rejected by the individual Narp.

Recent neo/speculative materialist trends do nothing to help the matter. They busy themselves with overturning a perceived problem with the restrictions of correlationist thought. All this achieves is highlighting the manifestation of realism as opposed to the very humble Kantian approach. It’s easy to see why. The staggering progress of science makes the Kantian limitation look ridiculous to some extent. The problem is no matter how ridiculous it might seem the Kantian stranglehold will not give way. It is always possible to perceive any anti-correlationist argument with skepticism. No matter how preposterous it might seem, the thing that we are could be ordering the structure of things in a seriously extreme manner. Equally of course the neo-materialism could be correct.

This dual possibility of correctness is again an agnostic disjunction and as mentioned, agnostic disjunction discloses manifestationism. Manifestationism is not another correlationism other than in a kind of epistemological sense. Manifestationism as tied to agnostic disjunction does say that you cannot know which philosophy is correct. This is somewhat in line with Laruelle’s notion of philosophical decision as endlessly self perpetuating. A possibility here though is that a philosophy is not a contingent activity, it is a necessary one of any being possessed of a certain degree of self-reflexivity. Such a being will always generate some kind of ontology even if it is not spelled out as an ontology. What is also true of what manifestationism says is that there may in fact be correct interpretations, these are not an impossibility. What is impossible is for us to be certain about them.

The question then is how to escape the circularity of asking what the site of the manifestations is. Any answer seems tied to being another manifestation. The answer seems though that it must be the same. The self-comprehension of the site is itself a flickering series of manifestations: a soul, a psychological self, a nothingness, a site of competing conceptual beings (tick). This must also be the case because any self-comprehension description must also be agnostic-disjunctive ontologically riddled supposition.

The next question is what determines which manifestations are dominant? The aforementioned power of science on various fronts serves to drive criteria that weaken the Kantian grip (but does not break it). This is a more interesting question insofar as the answer is less obvious.  Obviously it would once more invoke the circularity if there were an actual answer. The answer is once again that the determining factors of the dominating manifestations is agnostic-disjunctive multiple.

Here though it is worth noting that it is outside of manifestationism to say that all of the manifestations are information (pneuma) where information is a minimal relation between two putative discreta. Any decision on the nature of information is manifestation but there is the possibility of the bracketed acceptance a priori that it all must be information within the site of manifestations (bracketing off flat ontologies that obviate any such relations) -the tentative Narp.

This means the question as to what manifestation is dominant is entirely convertible into what information is dominant in a given site. This means everything in the manifestation site is information in the form of concepts: these are accretions of information (still no transgression of manifestationism has take place here) or pneuma as we call it generally.

This allows us the very general proposition which includes all senses of a self:

The site of manifestations is a region of conceptual interactions of multiple kinds.

Tentatively the multiple kinds could be the recently re-accreted 5 part description of the site:

+Telluric:       Anality

/Zephyric:      Neophobic/phillic

-Suphuric:      Awareness relation (interna/external)

*Hydric:          Affectivity control

=Pneumic:     Alterity Relation

Further exploration clearly needed.

It’s a heuristic. It has to be. The description must contain that impossible realm that Heidegger and Laruelle try to get to. It appears as the given, as facticity, as the one. The problem is immediately the hermeneutic structure of all things. What must be posited is an incoherent border that partially maps onto natural kinds and artifacts. Both are pneuma as both are informational. What is posited is a self giving spatio-temporality that manifests as pneuma necessarily (since this our element). This isn’t present at hand because it isn’t theoretical, but it is what the present at hand comes to analyse and posit as real. This is close to Laruelle’s one, if not identical. An actuality that is untheorisable that in fact emerges first as the ready to hand. This is what gives rise to the word-accretion that then enables present at hand reflection.

What is fascinating is that it seems that this stage shows only a pre-ontological solidity -because immanence only displays this (maybe this is questionable). It takes higher pneuminous structures to show magick as possibility. That is the the pre-ontological showing cannot comment ontologically. This maybe the pre-manifestational breakthrough.