Philosophy can a be tedious business. Repetition of the same matter is often the plat de jour. These recent notes do not alter this pattern. The situation we have here is an interesting one insofar as we have two philosophies that seem to have some potential to overlap. Is it an overlapping or a synthesis (or a struggle)? The repetition is the grinding over the same territory in search of the point of clarity.

The two philosophies in question are the pneuminous accretive theory and the assimilative-neurotic theory. Both notions instantiate autonomy to concepts.  The former by means of the way in which a concept accretes information (pneuma) and (under the strong magickal version) persists in existing as outside of the entities that create and are inhabited by them. The autonomy is pointed to by the phenomenology of synchronicity which suggests rogue pneuminous interference. Assimilation is not derived from occult phenomenology but more by the observation of a endless proliferation of concepts that synthesise with ourselves and with others. The pneuminous theory’s plug in of concept to vector is achieved (in assimilation) by the notion of tautology. This is also the case in accretive theory, the vector is the concept (though it can be taken over by others).  Object (vector) and concept achieve a kind of identity (tautology).

Assimilation is less ontologically restricted insofar as accretive theory is more descriptive of an actual ontology. This though is only true if one chooses a specific aspect (strong (magick obtains) or weak (magick does not obtain)) accretive theory. Any decision one way or the other results in a partial manifestation disclosure (and ontological decision). However remaining agnostic we still note reasonably that accretion takes place. This kind of accretion though must bracket off any ontological commitment. It can only note that information sticks together and note the hugely complex historical nature of these accretions that occur in NAA(assimilation-accretion)RP field. Assimilation likewise can only note the conceptual region’s ability to be plugged into (a bar, a board game, flatpack furniture, a piece of art). Every ontological description is just a further assimilation.

What we must note here is that assimilation can slide into ontological decision when we push a certain agenda too far. The agenda suggested here is that of pneuminous determination i.e. of the concept’s ability to control the NAARP (or not). It is easy to comprehend the NAARP as being purely controlled by the accretion-assimilations (since they are rendered autonomous). The version of this theory that commonly appears in here is that the self is one specific type of  AA (the neurotic accretion-assimilation or NAA) amongst various AAs. In the normal situation the NAA has the appearance of control whereas mental health issues can variously be described as the NAA being controlled by the AAs.

But how much control does the NAA have? Johns’ work sometimes suggests very little. It is this suggestion that can tip assimilation out of its meta potential into a conceptual determinism. The underlying manifestation concerns the nature of the NAA. Every which way you choose you enter an ontological decision.

Is the NAA’s control:

  1. Illusory entirely?
  2. Partially illusory?
  3. Actual?

Every choice entails a different ontological picture. E.g. if 1 then we can say the NAA may not be essentially different from any other AA -it has no more or less control than a table AA. 2 and 3 are compatible with the picture suggested above. The potential actual control of 3 does entail this is how things are only that an NAA could be in actual control. 2 suggests this never possible. Already a fourth possibility appears: that an NAA can be in more or less control at different times.

NPC type theories like this kind of notion by trying to insinuate that most NAARPs are controlled by concepts whilst allocating a sense of control to a specific group (the ones labelling the others). Such groups of course should be aware that factions within the enemy agent group will be thinking similarly about them.

 

“As for P, well P was a different matter. P was in a position to acknowledge -better than myself probably- the strangeness of the event, yet he seemed oblivious to the potential moral content. Q’s disappearnce was for him, a source of fascination, yet so great was this fascination that it eclipsed all other sense in his head, even senses pertinent to his own occult inquiry, thus again, in this sense also Q. was utterly gone.”

The notion increasingly presses that the titular agnostic disjunction may be the disjunction that colours all manifestations (ontological decisions). This clearly needs seriously thinking through but it seems a promising corridor. The claim possibly sounds extreme because of the usage of the term magick. In fairness this could be extreme as pneuminous manifestations go all the way up to the strangest cryptid encounter (and down to the simple synchronicity).

The disjunction is disclosed on the interpretation of the encounter. Does it actually seem to entail an alteration in the structure of the seemingly solid externality or doesn’t it? This externality is either inert to the conceptual overlay (pneuma) or it isn’t. In the occult event the externality seems breached by the pneuma, but the interpretation may draw it back into something commensurate with the solid externality -illusion, hallucination, confirmation bias.

In the Narp the different assimilation-accretions compete to take control of this space. This is difficult to move freely beyond because the nature of the Narp is also agnostic disjunctive: Is there an actual whole self or are there just the competing assimilation-accretions? What even would this difference look like?

In fact the latter entails the former insofar as the name of the Narp forms the centre around which the pneuminous structure accretes. This name-accretion is what we usually call the self, as such it is just one more assimilation-accretion in the Narp, except that in what we call psychological health, it is the dominant one (the neurotic accretion from the term NARP). The first arm of the disjunction on the Narp nature does not mean this. It rather suggests a real self somehow independent of the name. There are no doubt various shades of these but the basic real self or contingent self disjunction is primordial to the problem.

Now neither arm of contingent self/real self does not ally itself necessarily with either arm of magick obtains/does not obtain, rather it discloses these options:

i)  Real self-Magick obtains

ii)  Real self-Magick does not obtain

iii) Contingent self-Magick obtains

iv) Contingent self-Magick does not obtain

i)  The sense of (i) is difficult as of magick entails that information affects what it overlays, we cannot have a self that resists pneuminous interaction (claims itself to be apart from it). It is true that one could define magick such that it only affected reality outside of the self and one might also define the self as the higher self (the ensouled ontologies also feature here). In this sense it is possible to rescue (i). It is however minimally the most untenable of the manifestations.

ii) Is a situation a lot of people identify with. The self is real but our concepts do not affect the externality. It is difficult to make sense of this insofar as a rigid self is always difficult to justify -it is hard to see how any kind of self is inert to our interactions with it (without defining it out of harms way). However it has a coherence for people’s beliefs insofar as the solid external reality is reflected by a similar inward picture.

iii) This is the chaos magickal world commensurate with the philosophy described herein generally. The self is an assimilation-accretion and the possibility of the various assimilation-accretions linking up to make the externality change are actual.

iv) Describes a very rational understanding of the world. Pneuma cannot restructure reality but the self is recognised as contingent. As such assimilation-accretions happen but only at psychological level.

It will be noted in this that there are more manifestations lurking that have not yet been uncovered. The situation is constantly being referred to as one of a Narp conceptually comprehending an externality. This is of course what it looks like yet this situation itself is fraught by manifestationist decision. There may be no actual externality. The whole thing might be nothing but Berklean idea without even a God to prop it up. Of course this kind of idealism is difficult -a pure pneuma with no umbra-  because nothing then is given to determine why the world looks like one thing and not another and why it hangs together so well. It is however perfectly functional with magick, which now is not a conceptual overlay overpowering an umbratic but just restructuring of the information. This does also leaves the problem of within the pure idealism there are solid ideas and unsolid ones yet one can however posit this kind of idealism without actually having to explain its mechanics. It is a manifestation and one requires no externality that exists at all without the Narp. This pure idealism must also have its non-magickal opposite. This would be a situation of pure ideality which nevertheless is completely solid. In this manifestation, if it were possible to peek round the curtain one would see there was literally nothing outside of the Narp-field (presumably other aware beings too) yet within it it held together in an absolute consistency in which the idea world was not swayed by the ideas in each Narp. It is always interesting to note that such a pure idealism cannot extirpate the phantasy of the umbratic. Of course the idealism looks extremely untenable anyway but even from within one would still come up with the notion of what is there outside the Narp-field. The idealism must be raised as a manifestation though its agents are few and far between. It just needs noting as the means by which the externality may be rendered incoherent.

This incoherent idealism supplies the reinforcing clue to our starting point. The notion is that each ontology is not a singular ontology, but rather each is a manifestation but must also be bifurcated into its magick obtains/magick does not obtain disjunctive forms. This raises the possibility of other non-pneuminous magickal conceptions. For example transcendental realist/magick-obtains might invoke a completely different condition of possibility [for magick], a picture that might look more like a Harmanian occasionalism.

 

Either we must accept the (i) continuation of informational relations outside of the Narp-field or (ii) we postulate that this umbratic notion might, outside of the Narp-field exist in a manner necessarily unintelligible to us (non-information).

Conscious experience is said to constantly presuppose a vast and complicated world that facilitates it -atomic, cellular etc. This is true under the auspice of the first option but possibly unintelligible under the second. The thesis that emerges under the second (which is the one amenable to pneuminous interference (magick)) is the teasing out of the intuition of the disappearing of that world in its outside of the Narp-field. But here it becomes clear there is nothing clear about the Narp-field.

This is the land where Meillasoux like thought wants to point out the sheer madness of our continuing with a Kantian agenda in the face of an inescapably continuing world. The issue is not of a inescapably continuing world though, rather it is of the ontological status of this continuing world when it escapes our various fields of detection (umbra).

The umbra before was said to dwell in the beyond perception, but now we have an extension that possibly gives greater cogence to it. The umbra is also in hidden in the small and the great. Wherever we can no longer differentiate such that we can categorise then the umbratic is there. The fact that atomic/microscopic inspection discloses the same reality over and over again does not entail that this is exhaustive of the nature of it when it is not being drawn into the Narp-field proper.

Again it must be noted that this is not what we say is the case, only what is the case under a strict following of the possibility that unperceived being is actually different from perceived being (agnostic disjunction). To add extra confusion to this though, once we have the conceptual perception e.g. that air is these various gases which have these atomic natures, the vector that takes the air concept then becomes infected with this strict conceptualisation. This may be an accurate characterisation of concept and vector or it may be a concept that is overly simplifying the vector and rendering it closer to this simplification in the process.

In this way discussions about informational (pneuminous) relations between simpler beings are only intelligible insofar as we attribute the common existence that we are capable of understanding (even its scientific extensions) to these simpler beings (rocks). Insofar as this comprehension is reasonable (it is not unreasonable, but not unassailable) at what point do these pneuminous relations become what we consider accretions proper?

No answer given here should be taken as perfect, for this is just a working through. The answer though must surely concern the point at which a region processes information in such way that it retains it for temporal functionality -it can repeat the communication. This fulfils the basic notion of ‘this means this’ and thus a simple accretion is created. From this simple basis it seems the regions acquire greater complexity. When a region can process in such way that it recognises a phenomenon as a certain phenomenon and can indicate this to another region there is a further development. The accretion can then be passed on, thus amplifying the size of the accretion (no two perspectives, as is fondly pointed out, are identical). Taking parts of the vector field to be a kind of phenomenon is the primal form of magick. The ability to recognise this and manipulate it further is the Narp technological development we call [chaos] magick.

There is no spatial, chronological or privileged difference anymore between the real and the concept it mirrors. The real is imaginary and the imaginary is real. It is the closing of this distance that creates a flat, immanant and blindly operational space which I call assimilation. We cannot even relapse into older physicalist notions of the real such as external space and time: an action figure toy does not breathe-in the atmosphere of such a ‘space’, it’s context does not refer to that context shared by physical bodies in space and their social-political narrative.

King Kong is no less real than the chair you are sitting on. Both can be represented in external or eidetic space, Both have a use tem in language (i.e “have you seen King Kong?” or “where is my chair?”). Both have other relations that differ from their present use; King Kong is identified through various relations, contexts and histories such as Science-fiction, the toy industry, the film industry, exoticism, the place Skull Island etc.

Reality – the sum of experience – is not weird, funny nor horrific, ‘It’ simply is. The only other capacity that can achieve this indifference, this reality, is neurosis (hence equating neurosis with experience). In Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle neurosis is the only thing that escapes designation (goes ‘beyond’ it). Content in the mind is designated as ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘pleasurable’ or ‘painful’ but neurosis is the condition which produces content in the brain; it decides, through repetition, whether X will appear bad or good. In other words, the neurotic capacity to repeat and fixate (i.e to simulate experience) is found in both sane and insane experiences, both happy and sad ones. Ergo neurosis is this indifferent reality that we speak of (or at least the condition for it). The ability of this Expressivist (Deleuze) or Contructivist neurosis is precisely what Baudrillard is talking about when he observes the relative autonomy of simulation and simulacra (from army training courses to Disney Land); that the real is manipulable based on the relatability of signs, and it is only ‘use’ (and the conventionalising of use) that separates the reality of Disney Land from the reality of a romantic relationship, a 9 – 5 job etc. To be sure, there will be simulations (assimilations) that appear without your consent (what has been ontically found in traditional psychological neurosis); your mind will try and make a reality out of something, a web of designations that one could live within. Based on generic and personal dialectics between general concepts (their ‘shareability’) and your experience, such tensions will spark semantic tensions, but this doesn’t have to be exclusively psychological; a man’s fear of nudity might stem from him encountering his parents having sexual intercourse at an early age, but other symptoms can occur simply by living in a restrictive society. The idea of getting up at 6am the next morning is semantically implicated by the state of drunkenness I am in at midnight. These are not neutral concepts changing under circumstances of the individual; they are concepts that have their own pleasure principle, their own likes and dislikes, their own preferable assimilative processes. 

Similar to psychology, however, there seems to be a heuristic difference between process and form; the almost vitalist force of un-designateable reality, of infinite neuroses and assimilations, that only take on meaning when formed and chafed by humans (or living creatures), that become representations amongst other representations like some form of atomistic idealism. The designation of meaning is superimposed onto the domesticated world through our practices, and we inherit these meanings as they enjoy dominion over us or become ‘challenged’ (Nietzsche). The usability of the concept has always carried a correlate of desire with it (the need to be used) and hence concepts cannot be severed from the desire for designation, ergo, concept traces will always tell you more than what is designated on the surface (see Graham Freestone – ‘Spider-Spit’). We always knew this sensitive fragility in the ‘human subject’ (the psychological subject) but now its time to look at the concepts ‘themselves’, as artefacts of the incoherence/incommensurability of present day human.

The first dictum of psychology ; one should never blame themselves for themselves.

The thorns of this thicket are well known to philosophers (and non-philosophers). The umbra is said to be the phantasy of the remainder. That is, when beings which are aware of their apparent externality (like Narps) are removed what remains is the umbra. As such of course whilst being a pneuminous accretion it is a paradoxical one that tends towards articulating the impossibility of pneuma. As we have mentioned elsewhere, the umbra is not the in itself, since any in itself must take into account the relation between any aware beings and the putative externality.

This immediately raises the problem as to whether or not pneuma is just a phenomenon for Narps, a path well trodden in OOO. In OOO the implication seems to be that obviously pneuminous relations hold between accretions external to Narps, which in turn seems to assume reality is, with various temporal and spatial relativities accepted, the same kind of container that Narps exist in. It seems reasonable, this is the ‘speculative’ part in ‘speculative realism’.

Pneuma is information, of course there must be informational exchanges between the different kinds of regions surely? But of course it isn’t this simple. Firstly there is a heuristic difference between pneuma and pneuminous accretions. Pebble pneuminous relations do not accrete (at least if we allow ourselves the same speculation as OOO) other than in the damage to the pebble, there is no pebble image of the other pebble that smashed into it, there is no word ‘pebble’ for the pneuma to accrete around. There is information (pneuma) but no accretion. Secondly the condition for the possibility of informational exchange in a meaningful way is discretion. There must be things and they must be in a sense external to Narps continue to be discrete from one another in order for meaningful pneuminous exchanges to continue. It doesn’t seem to me that this has any necessity to it. Discretion could in a Kantian (Schopenhaurian) manner be entirely a product of the Narp-field. Why would we say such a thing?

The answer once again turns on the agnostic disjunction concerning the problem of magick. The agnostic disjunction has to decide in favour of magick not obtaining in order to gain any traction with discretion continuing outside of the Narp-field. But this disjunction cannot be resolved (not with current Narp epistemic restrictions). Magickal phenomena, specifically those which suggest pneuminous interference (perceived effectivity of spells or synchronicity)  in ‘reality’, suggest the whole thing can alter just like ‘that’. The ‘magick obtains’ side of the disjunction precisely looks like discretion (at least in the continual spatial sense ordinarily presupposed) may be exactly what is not going on. This is where we’ve drawn a small amount of inspiration from Laruelle’s  phrase non-philosophy, to coin non-information. That is, the umbra is speculatively non-informational. Whatever it is, and like Laruelle’s ‘the one’ it is also indifferent to predicating existence of it, it is potentially of an informational order that cannot be considered information in the way we understand it (as Brassier points out non-philosophy can said to be not so much its negation as more like the ‘non’ in non-Euclidean geometry). The non-informational umbra is not posited as a necessity but rather a necessity only given certain agnostic disjunctive options. In response to the possibility of magick the non-informational umbra is posited as radically and paradoxically empty. The notion is somewhat reminiscent of Meillasoux’s hyper-chaos. The umbra which in its restraint of the pneuma looks so powerful, is suddenly [apparently] altered in an incomprehensible manner. This happens at the level of the accretion -the symbol manifests in poignancy, hence the phrase used elsewhere ‘the pneuma affects the umbra’. The supposed structure of the umbra was suddenly nothing. The information that was thought to be in-it was suddenly shown to be only pneuminous. Yet the concomitant perpetuity of the solidity re-continues to suggest that the event was actually illusion and that there was no rupture and the agnostic disjunction swings back in favour of the solid outside and the umbratic (as-real) reasserts its dominance.