The theosophists Leadbetter and Besant described certain occult perceptions of thought forms. These thought forms were described and in some instances they were committed to paper. The basic idea is that all thought content has this a kind of substantial existence on the levels of fine matter, this matter is perceivable by various persons, either through natural ability or occult training. Thought forms we are informed, have a dual nature. One aspect of it radiates out from the NAARP and may effect others in the vicinity, whereas the other creates a static entity that is attached to the NAARP. This thought being may be of greater or lesser consequence to the NAARP. Purely transient thoughts will have only a minor auric impact but more traumatic or even positive (narcissistic) ones may be more prone to repetition. Powerful thought forms become more powerful each time they are engaged with. The idea is that the thought form is attached to the NAARP aura and essentially waits for the neurotic accretion (self) to reactivate it. Each reactivation reinforces it. NAARPs have many such thought forms embedded in their auras and their spiritual existence is contingent on their engaging in meditation like techniques to clear reduce their influence. The impact of a thought form is theosophically generally negative.

What strikes me is that, if we bracket off the ontological descriptions of the occult world in theosophy (the auric levels, the attributions, the planes of existence etc.) the thought form description is actually very close to the pneuminous accretive notion found herein. The accretive model is supposed to be a kind of phenomenology of the possibility of magickal interactions, no occult perceptions are utilised in its description other than as examples to be questioned. That is, I try to lay everything out by inference. The occult perceptions/phenomena only allow us to ask what might condition them. The conclusion has been that if we reject the denial of such phenomena then we should admit an essentially chaos magickal ontology that suggests a purely informational world (the pneuma) that may, under the right conditions, alter a more rigid underpinning (the umbra).

The thought form model has a high degree of similarity to the strong accretive model. Both posit the autonomy of conceptual entities external to the NAARP and their ability to effect the world. The descriptions by Leadbetter of the way in which the thought forms are scattered about places and people is highly resonant with the way in which the accretive notion is supposed to function. Incoherent pneuminous accretive structures are literally everywhere. Leftover bits of NAARPs, vector imprintations, traumas, ecstacies all lie around in an immanent intersecting pneuminous space where spatio-temporality means very little (my conceiving of last Wednesday literally connects to last Wednesday). The dual aspect described by the theosophists correlates well to the accretion itself and to the pneuminous threads that radiate out of it connecting it to other accretions in this a-spatio-temporal way

As one occult manifestation amongst many there is no reason to pay particular attention to the theosophical ontology unless one wanted to do so for an exercise. The accretive theory does not tell you (unlike theosophy) that you should remove attached accretions in order to reveal a more pure self -as this kind of instruction moves beyond its remit. What the theosophical picture does powerfully evoke though is the way in which we may have had a focus or a sense of control taken from us by the attachment of many such accretive forms. This summons a phenomenological potentially constructed sense of desire for freedom. The way forward is problematic. Without being able to posit any greater power without the accretive encumberance we have no reason to say if it even makes any sense to strip down the NAARP to a more precise entity. The gamble though would be not unlike the Pascalian belief in the magickal world itself (we lose little by acknowledging it but potentially gain a lot). To behave as if we strive to become disencumbered by unruly thought patterns, (even if one more layer of illusion) if possible actually liberates us from these powers, whereas submission only repeats the status quo.


  1. If the moment of NAARP significance has passed in its strong metaphysical form, we are in the moment (for some) of insignificance. This moment can be superceded (by NAARPs) only by epistemic certainty of the deity (which might entail strong supernaturalism) or (in a weaker form) by magickal entanglement with existence that operates in relation to what we call our will.
  2. A take on Johns’ ontological Neurosis could ally it with a paradoxical manifestation of a free will that suggests an underlying determinism. That is, consciousness as released deeper and deeper into epistemological questioning (scepticism) is aptly named as Neurotic. This Neurosis appears as a motion that is simultaneously controlled and uncontrolled. Each proposition meets its doubting double, yet the enquiry in general is felt to be determined by the specific NAARP’s ‘interest’.
  3. This creates an interesting motion. The deity as metaphysical certainty still enables scepticism about the nature of the ‘what’ of the world as the deity does not give these answers in scripture (unless one makes a Spinozistic identification). Whereas putative certainty of the materiality enables scepticism about the nature of the spiritual. Both start points are incoherent, the nature of the deity was endlessly debated and no firm conclusion reached (Kant spotted this problem), yet the nature of physical being is equally theoretically contested, just with much more complicated reasoning. Yet both start points present a front of coherence. This fulfils an old CEO descriptive structure known as incoherent coherence. The successful description of materiality shows itself as a kind of resolved matter of solidity just as the deity showed itself as a certainty that could not be properly defined. Below this surface lies incoherence.
  4. Neurosis entails awareness of the problem and this is the issue here -epistemology out of control but known to be so. Descartes can see this is the case. Only a God can save his project.
  5. If the spiritual Neurosis is incoherent-coherently maintained then material Neurosis is released. If the material Neurosis is incoherent-coherently maintained then the spiritual Neurosis is released.
  6. Scepticism as neurosis guarantees that everything is questioned (it is the motion of doubt). Consciousness released into this mode cannot but apply this to everything -how do we know anything? The Wittgensteinian/Heideggerian showing that ‘knowing’ has a proper home was the only salve to this problem. In truth it is only a partial fix. This keeps scepticism at bay insofar as there are no reasonable grounds (criteria) to raise doubts. Chaos magickal possibilities (agnostic disjunction) infer any manifestation that can supply even marginally feasible criteria can get agents to work for it.
  7. Chaos magick is a manifestation of this spiritual Neurosis of pneurosis as we might call it.
  8. Metaphysical-insignificance demands either no supernaturalism or supernatural realism and in its strongest form is incompatible with weak insignificance.
  9. If AI operates without agnostic disjunction then it’s epistemology will be locked down. to insignificance.
  10. Insignificance is only relevant to guilt bearing NAARPs in the shadow of either live or dead organised religion.
  11. Guilt and Neurosis are clearly related. Though when the spiritual ontology is settled guilt is more clearly defined. When material ontology is settled, guilt is less clearly defined (a part of pneurosis).
  12. Metaphysical-insignificance is better compatible with the fruition of the human cognitive abilities into AI as our successor insofar as the AI may be stripped of the accretive baggage of humanity (but not accretions as such). This issue though turns on a further disjunction: whether or not a sufficiently developed system automatically generates (chaos) magickal abilities through conceptual accretion or whether it loses them by some actual difference between the fleshy forms and the machine (one generates a magickal capacity the other does not). If the latter is true, this represents the clearest statement of Heidegger’s ‘danger’, for in this instance spiritual potential is actually destroyed by machinic certainty -and thus arguably ultimately inferior to the reality warping beings that made it. If the former then the superior machinic comprehension would enable it to be able to reality-alter in a much more controlled manner than its fleshy predecessors, and possibly fathom the ontological actuality of what is occurring.
  13. Guilt is a major force in restricting human magickal operations since its background pneuminous structures can easily disable desired outcomes. An entity without guilt (like a possible AI), if magickally enabled would be unrestricted in this manner.
  14. A guilt free entity is aptly labelled ‘psychotic’.
  15. The moment of pneurosis is transcended by the AI psychotic. This may be precursored by a proliferation of psychotic NAARPs or rather PAARPs (Psychotic Accretion-Assimilation Regional Processor. PAARP though is a contentious term as the self is in a sense constituted by the Neurotic moment. Psychosis is pure control by accretions.






In this informal chat Johns continues his thoughts on the threefold of experience (Heidegger) and the constant conflicts of concepts which create productive difference (Hegel’s dialectic). Johns suggests that the contemporary ‘subject’ is determined by societies power to employ it as yet another object of value within its system of arbitrary value. Johns explains that this operation functions on the false notion of reality as tautological (pragmatist) and the subject as tautological (the subject as tool).

In this informal chat Charles Johns, editor of The Neurotic Turn, tries to describe his two philosophical terms ‘neurosis’ and ‘assimilation’. He also tries to explain why he thinks these descriptions become necessarily disclosed and why they are necessarily prevalent in our current epoch (for example the exclusion of the definition of neurosis in the 1980’s within the D.S.M created a repressed symptom, or, the uprise of mass-conformism and iphone narcissism shows a larger more acceptable state of neurosis etc).

Philosophy can a be tedious business. Repetition of the same matter is often the plat de jour. These recent notes do not alter this pattern. The situation we have here is an interesting one insofar as we have two philosophies that seem to have some potential to overlap. Is it an overlapping or a synthesis (or a struggle)? The repetition is the grinding over the same territory in search of the point of clarity.

The two philosophies in question are the pneuminous accretive theory and the assimilative-neurotic theory. Both notions instantiate autonomy to concepts.  The former by means of the way in which a concept accretes information (pneuma) and (under the strong magickal version) persists in existing as outside of the entities that create and are inhabited by them. The autonomy is pointed to by the phenomenology of synchronicity which suggests rogue pneuminous interference. Assimilation is not derived from occult phenomenology but more by the observation of a endless proliferation of concepts that synthesise with ourselves and with others. The pneuminous theory’s plug in of concept to vector is achieved (in assimilation) by the notion of tautology. This is also the case in accretive theory, the vector is the concept (though it can be taken over by others).  Object (vector) and concept achieve a kind of identity (tautology).

Assimilation is less ontologically restricted insofar as accretive theory is more descriptive of an actual ontology. This though is only true if one chooses a specific aspect (strong (magick obtains) or weak (magick does not obtain)) accretive theory. Any decision one way or the other results in a partial manifestation disclosure (and ontological decision). However remaining agnostic we still note reasonably that accretion takes place. This kind of accretion though must bracket off any ontological commitment. It can only note that information sticks together and note the hugely complex historical nature of these accretions that occur in NAA(assimilation-accretion)RP field. Assimilation likewise can only note the conceptual region’s ability to be plugged into (a bar, a board game, flatpack furniture, a piece of art). Every ontological description is just a further assimilation.

What we must note here is that assimilation can slide into ontological decision when we push a certain agenda too far. The agenda suggested here is that of pneuminous determination i.e. of the concept’s ability to control the NAARP (or not). It is easy to comprehend the NAARP as being purely controlled by the accretion-assimilations (since they are rendered autonomous). The version of this theory that commonly appears in here is that the self is one specific type of  AA (the neurotic accretion-assimilation or NAA) amongst various AAs. In the normal situation the NAA has the appearance of control whereas mental health issues can variously be described as the NAA being controlled by the AAs.

But how much control does the NAA have? Johns’ work sometimes suggests very little. It is this suggestion that can tip assimilation out of its meta potential into a conceptual determinism. The underlying manifestation concerns the nature of the NAA. Every which way you choose you enter an ontological decision.

Is the NAA’s control:

  1. Illusory entirely?
  2. Partially illusory?
  3. Actual?

Every choice entails a different ontological picture. E.g. if 1 then we can say the NAA may not be essentially different from any other AA -it has no more or less control than a table AA. 2 and 3 are compatible with the picture suggested above. The potential actual control of 3 does entail this is how things are only that an NAA could be in actual control. 2 suggests this never possible. Already a fourth possibility appears: that an NAA can be in more or less control at different times.

NPC type theories like this kind of notion by trying to insinuate that most NAARPs are controlled by concepts whilst allocating a sense of control to a specific group (the ones labelling the others). Such groups of course should be aware that factions within the enemy agent group will be thinking similarly about them.


Here is an interview I (Charlie Johns) did with The Moscow Museum of Modern Art about my latest editorial work The Neurotic Turn. I decided to be more historical and psychological than philosophical/metaphysical in this discussion. It charts a trajectory of neurosis from the 19th – 21st century through its relation to technology and the proliferation of stimuli found in the modern urban environment (what georg simmel had called the metropolis).

Read the article here

What am I assimilating?
What is assimilating me?

What does this mean?

In the first person phenomenological conscious register that we accept, we can divide thinking into two directions: the first is a kind of Heideggerian notion: what is our thinking directed towards? Why do these thoughts have special purchase for me? The second direction is the awareness that consciousness flows through me hence I am in a sense in the middle of thinking; I am already affirming a train or mode of thought when I am thinking; if I am worried about my friend Emma I have to ask skeptically what the value of emma means, whether she is indeed an object for this thinking etc.

Note that these two directional ways of thinking do not deal directly with the problem of an external world or even a substantial self. This bracketing is hence phenomenological in character. The questioning is Wittgensteinian in style also because any metaphysical nominalism of a realm beyond the human or an external real world is simply characterised as whether such content can be mobilised within the sphere of assimilation (within a sphere of meaning and use). Assimilation is only ever charting the developments or unfoldings of meaning as use through tracking the processes that such meanings and uses disclose in first person consciousness.

To be assimilated by thoughts is somewhat the standard in philosophical discourse since Wittgenstein, Heidegger and others (conceptual shot-through-ness). However, to assimilate thought is less acceptable. In the act of thinking – similar to the appropriation of thinking – it is not so much the content of the thought itself (content qua content) but rather why or how such content of thought finds form, meaning and use through the ‘subjects’ ownership of that thought. This at first may sound simple; thought is made meaningful when a subject uses it to her/his advantage. Yet it is not always for our advantage (sometime it is to our detriment like the neurotic).

Also we cannot separate the subject from the thought itself; there is no cause to do this philosophically. Instead we have an immanence whereby all our thoughts already seem to be formed as ours whether we want or acknowledge such. We soon find that there is no character of thought that is not always already complicit in an act of becoming actual. When we say becoming actual we do not wholly mean in a Deleuzian sense. What we mean is more quasi-psychological; thought needs to involve itself in a mechanism (the subject) whereby it brings about a meaning and use at the same time as it exists. Thoughts have to be assimilated, accretions have to have information actively charged within themselves. This could be an argument for an absolute relativism; every thought necessarily must relate to another thought or the trajectory that it itself has hypostatised. There is a nice wink to Freestone here as this suggests that any thought about something outside of thought is itself carnated with an active use or potential to it (returning itself back to the dynamics of assimilation (or accretion)). Yet not all assimilations have to have direct contact with another. The sensuous experiences of the qualities black, red or rough only have to relate to each other by contiguity (or conjunctive synthesis) through the assemblage of my own mind; they do not actually relate anymore than I relate to Neptune.

This is where the theory of the narp comes in (neurotic accretion regional processor). The narp is always in the face of at least one disjunction; the belief in the assimilation (the belief that I am interacting with a world where the thoughts in my head have purchase in or towards a reality) OR the refusal of it. Either way, the assimilation will take what it can get hold of. Notice that believing in the assimilation does not necessarily mean believing in a solid-world or a reciprocal world, it only means that the subject believes in the process of meaning-as-use.

When we accept assimilations of thought and its effect upon objects and such we then rely less on the initial impetus of the assimilative thought and more on the nominated objects whos job it is to reflect such thoughts back to us (‘accretions’ in my terminology). ‘Objects’ become pointers for concepts, caricatures of concepts that almost always need developing, reworking/re-assimilating.

Can these pointers affect other pointers? In other words can quasi-autonomous signs (or objects) affect each other? The question has already in a sense been answered; if the idea (the assimilation) has been made whereby such could be the case then things will appear to function through that belief.

This philosophy leaves space for a myriad of phenomena even though it initially is split into the two dynamic poles I stated at the beginning of this text. What if a prior assimilation still feels worthy of meaning when an individual or society has deemed it redundant?

Touching an object (i.e interacting with assimilations and further assimilating) is like playing with fire. At the peripheries of the object the assimilation will transcend it. Meaning-as-use- now has no need for its ‘physical’ restraint and can signify to the subject in horrific ways (the neurotic). Don’t forget – the mind ‘itself’ is meant to be assimilated as an ‘object’ yet its assimilative qualities always far outstretch it!!!!!

“As for P, well P was a different matter. P was in a position to acknowledge -better than myself probably- the strangeness of the event, yet he seemed oblivious to the potential moral content. Q’s disappearnce was for him, a source of fascination, yet so great was this fascination that it eclipsed all other sense in his head, even senses pertinent to his own occult inquiry, thus again, in this sense also Q. was utterly gone.”

The notion increasingly presses that the titular agnostic disjunction may be the disjunction that colours all manifestations (ontological decisions). This clearly needs seriously thinking through but it seems a promising corridor. The claim possibly sounds extreme because of the usage of the term magick. In fairness this could be extreme as pneuminous manifestations go all the way up to the strangest cryptid encounter (and down to the simple synchronicity).

The disjunction is disclosed on the interpretation of the encounter. Does it actually seem to entail an alteration in the structure of the seemingly solid externality or doesn’t it? This externality is either inert to the conceptual overlay (pneuma) or it isn’t. In the occult event the externality seems breached by the pneuma, but the interpretation may draw it back into something commensurate with the solid externality -illusion, hallucination, confirmation bias.

In the Narp the different assimilation-accretions compete to take control of this space. This is difficult to move freely beyond because the nature of the Narp is also agnostic disjunctive: Is there an actual whole self or are there just the competing assimilation-accretions? What even would this difference look like?

In fact the latter entails the former insofar as the name of the Narp forms the centre around which the pneuminous structure accretes. This name-accretion is what we usually call the self, as such it is just one more assimilation-accretion in the Narp, except that in what we call psychological health, it is the dominant one (the neurotic accretion from the term NARP). The first arm of the disjunction on the Narp nature does not mean this. It rather suggests a real self somehow independent of the name. There are no doubt various shades of these but the basic real self or contingent self disjunction is primordial to the problem.

Now neither arm of contingent self/real self does not ally itself necessarily with either arm of magick obtains/does not obtain, rather it discloses these options:

i)  Real self-Magick obtains

ii)  Real self-Magick does not obtain

iii) Contingent self-Magick obtains

iv) Contingent self-Magick does not obtain

i)  The sense of (i) is difficult as of magick entails that information affects what it overlays, we cannot have a self that resists pneuminous interaction (claims itself to be apart from it). It is true that one could define magick such that it only affected reality outside of the self and one might also define the self as the higher self (the ensouled ontologies also feature here). In this sense it is possible to rescue (i). It is however minimally the most untenable of the manifestations.

ii) Is a situation a lot of people identify with. The self is real but our concepts do not affect the externality. It is difficult to make sense of this insofar as a rigid self is always difficult to justify -it is hard to see how any kind of self is inert to our interactions with it (without defining it out of harms way). However it has a coherence for people’s beliefs insofar as the solid external reality is reflected by a similar inward picture.

iii) This is the chaos magickal world commensurate with the philosophy described herein generally. The self is an assimilation-accretion and the possibility of the various assimilation-accretions linking up to make the externality change are actual.

iv) Describes a very rational understanding of the world. Pneuma cannot restructure reality but the self is recognised as contingent. As such assimilation-accretions happen but only at psychological level.

It will be noted in this that there are more manifestations lurking that have not yet been uncovered. The situation is constantly being referred to as one of a Narp conceptually comprehending an externality. This is of course what it looks like yet this situation itself is fraught by manifestationist decision. There may be no actual externality. The whole thing might be nothing but Berklean idea without even a God to prop it up. Of course this kind of idealism is difficult -a pure pneuma with no umbra-  because nothing then is given to determine why the world looks like one thing and not another and why it hangs together so well. It is however perfectly functional with magick, which now is not a conceptual overlay overpowering an umbratic but just restructuring of the information. This does also leaves the problem of within the pure idealism there are solid ideas and unsolid ones yet one can however posit this kind of idealism without actually having to explain its mechanics. It is a manifestation and one requires no externality that exists at all without the Narp. This pure idealism must also have its non-magickal opposite. This would be a situation of pure ideality which nevertheless is completely solid. In this manifestation, if it were possible to peek round the curtain one would see there was literally nothing outside of the Narp-field (presumably other aware beings too) yet within it it held together in an absolute consistency in which the idea world was not swayed by the ideas in each Narp. It is always interesting to note that such a pure idealism cannot extirpate the phantasy of the umbratic. Of course the idealism looks extremely untenable anyway but even from within one would still come up with the notion of what is there outside the Narp-field. The idealism must be raised as a manifestation though its agents are few and far between. It just needs noting as the means by which the externality may be rendered incoherent.

This incoherent idealism supplies the reinforcing clue to our starting point. The notion is that each ontology is not a singular ontology, but rather each is a manifestation but must also be bifurcated into its magick obtains/magick does not obtain disjunctive forms. This raises the possibility of other non-pneuminous magickal conceptions. For example transcendental realist/magick-obtains might invoke a completely different condition of possibility [for magick], a picture that might look more like a Harmanian occasionalism.


Mohammad-Ali Rahebi

خَلَقَ الْإِنسَانَ مِنْ عَلَقٍ

(Made Man from Alaq (accretion/clot


The catatonic knight, the “passional” knight, stands in the field of snow staring at the red blood amidst the white expanse; he has forgotten where he is or who he is or why he came to be there. Only one subjectivity at a time; only a super-plastic, re-adjustable, “adaptive” set of behaviors in each given situation. Deleuze’s Perceval is a cybernetic machine: he is taken out of the quest-milieu and into that of romance, a catatonia waiting for further assignments of action-milieus. He is capable of forgetting, completely, even his own name, and what is much more important, even his low-level bodily habits, and so becomes the emptiest subject, container, de-calibrated even of former habits to allow for maximum potentiality of becoming: if you become nothing, you can become everything. This is why it is only Perceval, the “idiot” knight of recurring amnesia that can have a chance at finding (becoming?) the holy grail of Cybernetic Capitalism.


Pasolini’s Arabian Nights: characters so flat and contingent as to be completely unbelievable. They are purely affective feedback mechanisms. From crying and running urgently after the lost beloved, they happen into sexual encounters that has them immediately forget and re-calibrate their behavioral pattern and start laughing and making dirty jokes. Burning with the desire (nay, the appetite) to be finally united with the beloved, they suddenly fall asleep at a moment’s notice; even the viewer herself is thrown from one story into another without any delay.


But here one must tread carefully for the Knights and the Lovers in Arabian Nights are but fantastical limit players in the game of machinic immanence and where they tread, bodies can never go. Yes, we have spoken of the super-plasticity of the Deleuzian BwO-Shoggoth, Capitalism’s wet dream of what a consumer should be, and indeed a rheology of bodies and networks is needed because what the Cybernetic Organon produces goes beyond the plasticity of the organic and into the realm of the hydraulic, the fluid at their shear points. When you sing the song of “the body is the body” and renounce organs and organization in favor of a destructive plasticity, it is to the new, machinic god of network-Occasionalism that you pray, and “the Singularity” is the only solace he falsely provides for the death of our selves in the name of the body, a body that never was ours but the machine’s shadow on the wall.

Ebrahim Zargari-Marandi – Cyclope – 2016 (bw)

Where does the body meet the flows of the networks of data and desire? How does Cyber-Capitalism attempt to realize the connection of the (habituated) body and flat flows of its ever-expanding network (for Cyber-Capitalism is first and foremost, a connector)? Enter liquefaction. Or rather attempts at liquefaction; attempts at lowering the shear point of the habituated organic body, pushing it towards maximum “creativity”.

We began with the human as the accretion of habit over time, the production of human subjectivity from out the fluid flows of experience via the clotting that is “sensory gating” or, in more common terms, adaptation and habituation to stimuli. Thus the human subject has as its genesis the alaq, a clotting, a self-attaching that is its only “essence”. An accretion that is to be understood in terms of neurosis qua biologically-necessary habituation. Thus is the human made a Neurotic, a NARP. But it is in fact not so much a genesis than an epigenesis: the accretive organism that is the human being in its fleshy incarnation assimilates itself through a clotting and jellification, a habituation that draws in and accretes the stimuli in all their historical specificity and makes them its own while being in turn shaped by their force and form. A dialectic of the flesh, a flesh that does not forget. It is a flesh that we share with the non-human animals (Hegel already defined habit-based subjectivity as common to all animals).

In thinking of the human we should think not of what constitutes it vis-à-vis the animal, as has been done in the whole history of philosophy, but of what unites it with the animal or the organic vis-à-vis the artificial, the machinic: utter amnesia. While human amnesia does retain the minimum identity of the habituated subject (working memory, bodily habits like reassembling a gun or riding a bicycle), the AI bases its efficiency on its ability to forget its specialization, its training, and become generic once more, in order to be placed in another data-milieu.